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I. INTRODUCTION
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,' the Supreme Court declared that
"certain anticompetitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the
Sherman Act."2  This Note will seek to determine whether bar
1. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The Court decided that bar association minimum fee
schedules violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). See text
accompanying notes 64-67 infra.
2. 421 U.S. at 793. Strict application of the antitrust laws to the legal profession
could invalidate many bar activities including (1) agreements not to compete with other
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association' efforts to restrict or regulate development of prepaid legal
services violate the federal antitrust laws.'
Prepaid legal service plans use risk sharing and risk spreading princi-
ples5 to provide legal services at reasonable cost." The plans may be
professions, compare Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951)
(agreements not to compete), with STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLES WITH RESPECT TO THE
PRACTICE OF LAW FORMULATED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN BAR Ass-
OCIATION AND VARIOUS BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL GROUPS reprinted in 6 MARTINDALE-
HUBBELL LAW DmECTORY 71C (1975); (2) accreditation of law schools, cf. Marjorie
Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools,
Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); United States Dental
Institute v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1975); and (3)
residence requirements for admission to the bar, see Note, The Sherman Act and Bar
Admission Residence Requirements, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 615 (1975). Arrange-
ments with individual attorneys could also be challenged as restraints of trade; for
example, a lender who requires applicants for purchase money mortgages to have their
title search performed by named attorneys may violate the Sherman Act under a tied
product theory. Compare Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495 (1969), with Forrest v. Capital Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 831 (M.D.
La. 1973), aff'd, 504 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1974).
3. Bar associations are classified according to the area from which they draw their
membership-local, state, or national. Membership in most bar associations is volun-
tary, but state bar associations may be "integrated"--that is, membership may be
required as a prerequisite to the practice of law in the state. See note 243 infra.
National bar associations include the American Bar Association, National Bar Associa-
tion, American Trial Lawyers Association, and National Lawyers Guild. See generally
V. COUNTRYMAN & T. FINMAN, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 324-403 (1966); G.
WINTERS, BAR ASSOcIATIoN ORGANIZATION AND ACvITmES (1954).
4. Because of restrictions in the state ethical code, the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice has twice refused to give a favorable business review letter to the
California Lawyers' Service prepaid legal services plan. See BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. No. 702, at A-12 (Feb. 25, 1975); BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REa. REP. No.
677, at D-5 (Aug. 8, 1974). See generally Bauer, Professional Activities and the Anti-
trust Laws, 50 NOTRE DAME Law. 570 (1975); Fisher & Galley, Antitrust Implications
of Prepaid Legal Services in Texas, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 451 (1975); Rigler, Professional
Codes of Conduct After Goldfarb: A Proposed Method of Antitrust Analysis, 29 ARK.
L. REV. 185 (1975); Note, Developments in California Private Legal Services Plans, 4
GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 155, 165-71 (1974); Comment, Applying the Sherman Act to
Restrictive Practices of the Legal Profession, 34 MD. L. REV. 571 (1974); Note, Prepaid
Legal Services, Ethical Codes, and the Snares of Antitrust, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 754
(1975); Note, Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-
Commercial" Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313 (1972).
5. Cf. AMERICAN BAR ASSOcIATION, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF
PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 29-33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as PREPAID LIIOAL SERVICES].
6. Proponents of prepaid legal services often assert that although the rich have
always been adequately supplied with lawyers and the poor receive legal services through
legal aid, the middle class constitute a vast undersupplied legal services market. See note
99 infra. Prepaid legal services are designed to meet the assumed need for low cost
services in the middle market. The ABA Special Committee to Survey Legal Needs has
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divided into two types, open panel plans and closed panel plans. Open
panel plans are analogous to Blue Cross prepaid medical service plans;
the client may select the lawyer of his choice, and the lawyer may charge
his customary fee. 7  Closed panel plans provide legal services only
through preselected attorneys, and generally the fees are prearranged."
Plans offered by organizations to their members are called group plans;
they may be open or closed.
Bar associations initially opposed all prepaid legal service plans. The
plans were presumed to conflict with traditional ethical prohibitions
against solicitation, third-party control of the attorney-client relation,
and "aiding the unauthorized practice of law."9 In addition, the plans
appeared to pose a competitive threat to traditional forms of delivery of
legal services, thus raising the specter of lower fees or complete loss of
some legal services to the competing prepaid form of delivery. Eventu-
ally, however, the bar came to realize that open panel plans merely
change the method of payment; since the lawyer's activities and fees are
unaffected, such plans do not pose an ethical or competitive threat.
Thus, the bar began actively supporting formation of open panel plans,
attempted to quantify legal needs; for a preliminary release of results, see 3 ALTERN-
ATIVES: LEGAL SERVICES & THE PUBLIC No. 1 (Jan. 1976) (special issue). More
conclusive empirical studies should soon be available, because legal constraints on the
provision of prepaid plans recently were removed by amendments to the Taft-Hartley
Act permitting joint labor-management contribution to prepaid plans, see sources cited
notes 268-72 infia and accompanying text, and by removal of most of the restrictions in
the Code of Professional Responsibility, see notes 34-44 infra and accompanying text.
Amendment of the Internal Revenue Code may also be necessary, however, for prepaid
plans to realize their full potential. See Hendricks, Federal Income Tax Consequences
of Group Legal Services Plans, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 431 (1975); Comment, Prepaid Legal
Service Plans-The Grasps of the Internal Revenue Code, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 544
(1975).
Estimates in 1973 placed the number of prepaid legal service plans at between 2,000,
H.R. REP. No. 205, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and 10,000, PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 35
(statemenlt of R. Connerton). Projections that the number of lawyers in the United
States will double between 1970 and 1985 stimulate interest in developing the prepaid
legal service market. Hearings on the Organized Bar: Self Serving or Serving the
Public? Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate
Comm. of the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 15 (1974) (statement of S. Kadison,
chairman. ABA Special Committee on Delivery of Legal Services).
7. Hearings on H.R. 13938 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972) (testimony of F.
McCalpin). See generally F. MARKS, R. HALLAVER, & R. CLI-TON, THE SHREVEPORT
PLAN: AN EXPERIMENT IN THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES (1974).
8. For examples of the operation of closed plans, see PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 41-
44 (plans of the California Teachers Ass'n & Laborers' Local 423, Columbus, Ohio).
9. See note 14 infra.
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while maintaining opposition to closed panel plans. More recently,
opposition to closed panel plans has been eroded both by consumer and
legislative pressures and by increased confidence that ethical problems
may be avoided without prohibiting that form of legal service delivery.
In discussing the effect of the antitrust laws on bar association efforts
to control prepaid legal services, this Note will first describe the mecha-
nisms by which bar associations have attempted to restrict and control
the development of prepaid plans. Second, the Sherman Act,10 section
7 of the Clayton Act," and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act 12 will be applied to bar association actions, and potential antitrust
liability assessed. Third, statutory jurisdiction of the antitrust laws over
bar association activities will be examined. Fourth, potential bar associ-
ation defenses under the Parker v. Brown' 1 state action exemption,
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and eleventh amendment will be analyzed.
The Note will conclude by recommending lines of action to minimize
antitrust exposure while maintaining legitimate ethical objectives.
11. BAR ASSOCIATION CONTROLS OVER
PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES
A. Ethical Restrictions on Attorney Participation in Prepaid Legal
Service Plans
Initially, bar associations successfully opposed prepaid legal service
plans as unauthorized practice of law by the sponsoring organization.14
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970).
11. Id. § 18.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. IV, 1974).
13. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
14. In a series of cases decided during the 1930's, automobile clubs offering legal
services to their members were held to be engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.
E.g., People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Motorists Ass'n, 354 Ill. 595, 188 N.E. 827
(1933); Rhode Island Bar Ass'.n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139
(1935). In several instances quo warranto actions were successfully maintained against
corporations set up to provide legal services. E.g., State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants'
Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 P. 694 (1919); People ex rel. Lawyer's Institute v.
Merchants Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 P. 363 (1922). See generally Note,
Group Legal Services and the Organized Bar, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRons. 228, 234-39
(1974).
The ABA Canons of Professional Ethics contained four provisions that could be used
against a lawyer providing prepaid legal services: Canon 27, prohibiting direct or indirect
solicitation; Canon 28, prohibiting "stirring up litigation;" Canon 35, prohibiting control
of the attorney-client relationship by a lay intermediary; and Canon 47, prohibiting
"aiding the unauthorized practice of law." The ABA Canons are set out in V.
COUNTRYMAN & T. FnqmA, supra note 3, at 885-97.
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A series of Supreme Court decisions, however, established that organiza-
tions have a fundamental right, protected by the first amendment free-
doms of speech, assembly, and petition, to provide legal service plans for
members. 15 Bar associations then shifted from direct attack on spon-
soring organizations to indirect control through ethical restrictions on
attorneys, and provision of legal services to a prepaid plan was made a
violation of the American Bar Association's (ABA) Code of Profession-
al Responsibility. The Code has been adopted by most jurisdictions,
and thus is the primary source of law governing attorney practices.16
The Code contains three classes of provisions-general statements of
ethical norms or Canons;' 7 Ethical Considerations, described as "aspira-
tional" recommendations of how an attorney should govern his profes-
sional behavior;18 and Disciplinary Rules, "mandatory" provisions that
may subject an attorney to disciplinary proceedings, including disbar-
ment, if violated.19
As originally adopted in 1969, the Disciplinary Rules of the Code
(after exempting certain charitable organizations) prohibited attor-
ney participation in prepaid legal services; exceptions were permitted
"only in those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional
interpretation at the time of the rendition of the services requires."2 The
15. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW v. Illinois
State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See generally note
303 infra.
16. See notes 45-48 infra and accompanying text.
17. Prepaid legal services are most directly affected by Canon 2: "A Lawyer Should
Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available."
ABA CODE OF PROFESIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY (1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE].
18. See ABA CODE (Preamble).
19. Id.
20. ABA CODE, DR 2-103. The Disciplinary Rule provided in part (emphasis
added):
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that recom-
mends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to promote the use of his
services or those of his partners or associates. However, he may coop-
erate in a dignified manner with the legal service activities of any of the
following, provided that his independent professional judgment is exer-
cised in behalf of his client without interference or control by any organ-
ization or other person:
(I) A legal aid office or public defender office:
(a) Operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school.
(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide nonprofit community or-
ganization.
(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency.
(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association represen-
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rule prohibited attorney participation in any prepaid plan not specifi-
cally approved by the courts, since only then would the bar be "re-
quired" to acquiesce in the plan. 1 Thus, the rule had the purpose
and effect of inhibiting attorney participation in prepaid legal service
plans.
The prepaid legal services rules were heavily criticized. 2  In the
tative of the general bar of the geographical area in which the
association exists.(2) A military legal assistance office.
(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar
association representative of the general bar of the geographical area
in which the association exists.
(4) A bar association representative of the general bar of the geographi-
cal area in which the association exists.
(5) Any other non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes, or
pays for legal services to its members or beneficiaries, but only in
those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional in-
terpretation at the time of the rendition of the services requires the
allowance of such legal service activities, and only if the following
conditions, unless prohibited by such interpretation, are met:(a) The primary purposes of such organization do not include the
rendition of legal services.
(b) The recommending, furnishing, or paying for legal services to
its members is incidental and reasonably related to the primary
purposes of such organization.
(c) Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from the
rendition of legal services by the lawyer.
(d) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are
rendered, and not such organization, is recognized as the client
of the lawyer in that matter.
This rule operated in combination with two others.
DR 2-101(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself . . . through . . . com-
mercial publicity. . . except as permitted under DR 2-103.
DI 2-103(C) A lawyer shall not request a[n] . . . organization to recom-
mend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself. . . except that he may
request referrals from a lawyer referral service operated . . . by a bar associa-
tion ....
Id. See also id. DR 2-104(A)(2), (3).
21. See DR 2-103(E):
A lawyer shall not accept employment when he knows or it is obvious that
the person who seeks his services does so as a result of conduct prohibited
under this Disciplinary Rule.
Id. See also id. DR 1-102(A)(1), (6).
22. The most extensive critique of the 1969 Code is contained in Symposium, 48
TEXAS L. REv. 255 (1970). Professor Sutton, Reporter for the ABA Special Committee
on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, called DR 2-103 "more in the nature of a lateral
pass of the problem to the United States Supreme Court than an attempt to find solid
grounds upon which to regulate group legal services." Sutton, The American Bar
Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 TExAs L. Rav.
255; 262 (1970). A member of the ABA Special Committee on Availability of Legal
Services called DR 2-103(D) (5) "unrealistic, inadequate, irresponsible, and unprofes-
sional. It disserves both the public and the bar." Nahstoll, Limitations on Group Legal
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/4
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1974 Houston Amendments the rules were changed23 to provide that
attorneys could participate in prepaid plans sponsored by bar associa-
tions24 or in open panel plans sponsored by "an insurance company or
other organization."25 Open panel plans could operate for profit and.
Service Arrangements Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-103(D) (5);
Stale Wine in New Bottles, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 334 (1970). The provision appears to
have been a necessary compromise. See Smith, Canon 2: "A Lawyer Should Assist the
Legal Profession in Fulfilling its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available," 48 TEXAS L.
REV. 285, 306-10 (1970). Many of the criticisms are summarized in Brown & Cohen,
Book Review, 5 VALP. U.L REv. 683 (1971), reprinted in Hearings on the Effect of
Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representation Before the Subcomm. on Representation
of Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
73 (1973). See also F. MARKS, K. LESwING & B. FORTINSKY, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC,
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY 264 (1972).
23. ABA, SUMMARY OF ACTION AND REPORTS TO THE HousE OF DELEGATES, 1974
MIDYEAR MEETING 3 (Action of the House on recommendations of the Ethics and
Professional Responsibility Committee) (Rep. No. 127).
24. DR 2-103:
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that fur-
nishes, or pays for legal services to others, to promote the use of his serv-
ices or those of his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm, as a private practitioner, except as permitted in DR
2-101(B). However, this does not prohibit a lawyer, or his partner, or
associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, from being
employed or paid by or cooperating with, one of the following offices
or organizations that promote the use of his services or those of his part-
ner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as
a private practitioner, if his independent professional judgment is exer-
cised in behalf of his client without interference or control by any organ-
ization or other person:
(I) A legal aid office or public defender office:
(a) Operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school.
(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide nonprofit community or-
ganization.
(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency.
(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association repre-
sentative of the general bar of the geographical area in which
the association exists.
(2) A military legal assistance office.
(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar
association representative of the general bar of the geographical
area in which the association exists.
(4) A bar association representative of the general bar of the geograph-
ical area in which the association exists or an organization operated,
sponsored or approved by such a bar association.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY (1974) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
cited as Houston Amendments]. References will be made to the Code as printed in the
1974 pamphlet by Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., but amendments can also be found in ABA,
SUMMARY OF ACTION AND REPORTS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 1974 MIDYEAR
MEETING (Section of General Practice Recommendations, Report No. 118).
25. Definition 8: 'Qualified legal assistance organization' [means a DR
2-103(D)(1)-(4) organization, or] plan operated . . .by an insurance com-
pany or other organization which plan provides that the members or bene-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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be offered by an organization formed solely to provide legal serv-
ices.26 But attorney participation in a closed panel plan was per-
mitted only if the sponsoring organization was nonprofit and not
formed primarily to provide legal services. The client had to be given a
refund-if he wanted an outside attorney. 7 Lawyers employed by bar-
ficiaries may select their counsel from lawyers [in good standing numbering
not less than the greater of three hundred or twenty percent of those licensed
to practice in the geographical area].
id. at 48C. See note 26 infra.
26. DR 2-103(D)(5)(b): [Lawyers may participate in plans sponsored by]
a qualified legal assistance organization (not described in DR 2-102 [sic:
should be 2-103](D) (1) through (4)) [provided the following conditions are
satisfied]:
(i) The primary purpose of such organization may be profit or nonprofit
and it may include the recommending, furnishing, rendering of or pay-
ing for legal services of all kinds.(ii) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are rendered,
and not such organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in
the matter.(iii) Such organization is in compliance with all applicable laws, rules of
court and other legal requirements that govern its operations.(iv) The lawyer, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm, shall not have initiated such organization for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of providing financial or other benefits
to him or to them.
Houston Amendments.
27. DR 2-103(D) (5). Lawyers may participate in plans sponsored by:
[a]ny other organization that furnishes, renders, or pays for legal services to
its members or beneficiaries, provided the following conditions are satisfied:(a) As to such organizations other than a qualified legal assistance organiza-
tion:
(i) Such organization is not organized for profit and its primary pur-
poses do not include the recommending, furnishing, rendering of or
paying for legal services.(ii) Said services must be only incidental and reasonably related to the
primary purposes of such organization.(iii) Such organization or its parent or affiliated organization does not
derive a profit or commercial benefit from the rendition of legal
services by the lawyer.
(iv) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are ren-
dered, and not such organization, is recognized as the client of the
lawyer in that matter.(v) Any of the organization's members or beneficiaries is free to select
counsel of his or her own choice, provided that if such independent
selection is made by the client, then such organization, if it custom-
arily provides legal services through counsel it pre-selects, shall
promptly reimburse the member or beneficiary in the fair and
equitable amount said services would have cost such organization if
rendered by counsel selected by said organization.(vi) Such organization is in compliance with all applicable laws, rules
of court and other legal requirements that govern its operations.(vii) The lawyer, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affili-
ated with him or his firm, shall not have initiated such organization
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of providing financial or other
benefits to him or to them.
(viii) The articles of organization, by-laws, agreement with counsel, and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/4
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sponsored plans, open panel plans, and insurance plans could solicit
individuals to join their plan; lawyers employed by closed panel plans
could not."' A provision of the 1969 Code making the lawyer liable for
disciplinary action if employed by an organization that violated the
Code rules was retained. 29 Ethical consideration 2-33 was added to
the Code; it strongly suggested that participation in closed panel plans
was unethical."°
The Houston Amendments were criticized more severely than the
original Code provisions;3 critics included the Antitrust Division of the
the schedule of benefits and subscription charges are filed along
with any amendments or changes within sixty days of the effective
date with the court or other authority having final jurisdiction for
the discipline of lawyers within the state, and within sixty days of
the end of each fiscal year a financial statement showing, with re-
spect to its legal service activities, the income received and the ex-
penses and benefits paid or incurred are filed in the form such au-
thority may prescribe.
(ix) Provided, however, that any non-profit organization which is or-
ganized to secure and protect Constitutionally guaranteed rights
shall be exempt from the requirements of (v) and (viii).
Id. (emphasis added).
28. DR 2-104 Suggestion of Need of Legal Services
(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should
obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting
from that advice, except that:
(2) A lawyer may accept employment that results from his participation
in activities designed to educate laymen . . . if such activities are
conducted or sponsored by a qualified legal assistance organization.
[See note 25 supra.]
(3) A lawyer who is recommended, furnished or paid by any of the of-
fices or organizations enumerated in DR 2-103(D) (1) through (5)
may represent a member or beneficiary thereof . . . . A lawyer
whose services are currently being . . . paid for by a legal assistance
organization defined in DR 2-103(D)(5)(a) may not accept em-
ployment as a private practitioner from a member or beneficiary of
such a legal assistance organization in any matter not covered by
the benefits provided under the plan of such organization when such
member or beneficiary has been his client under such plan.
Id. (emphasis added).
29. See note 21 supra.
30. See EC 2-33, Houston Amendments, quoted in note 102 infra.
31. See Brinkman, Of Arterial Passageways Through The Legal Process: The Right
of Universal Access to The Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 595, 659
n.358 (1973) ("arguably even more inconsistent with the first amendment than the
present rule"); Elson, Canon 2-The Bright and Dark Face of the Legal Profession, 12
SA DiEGo L. REv. 306, 308 (1975). See generally Hearings on Recent Developments
in Prepaid Legal Services Plans Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen
Interests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). A suit was
filed by consumer groups against the ABA. Prelaw Society v. ABA, Civil. No. 75-009
(M.D. Tenn., Jan. 10, 1975) (complaint withdrawn following amendment of the
Code in Feb. 1975).
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Justice Department. 32  The ABA, aware of the questionable legality of
the Houston Amendments,33 removed most of the restrictions at the
1975 Midyear Meeting in Chicago (the Chicago Amendments) . 4
The Chicago Amendments permit attorney participation in pre-
paid plans if three kinds of requirements are met. First, the sponsoring
organization must not profit from "the rendition of legal services,"3
and, if the sponsoring organization is "organized for profit," the plan
must be open panel.3" Second, the attorney must not use the organiza-
tion to solicit clients for private practice.3 7  Thus, although "dignified
commercial publicity" is now permitted for authorized organizations,
identification of lawyers is permitted only "in communications . . .
directed to a member or beneficiary of such organization. 38  Under
32. See Hearings, supra note 31, at 94, 98-99 (testimony of Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Wilson); BNA ANTrrrusT & TRADE REG. REP. No. 677, at E-1 (Aug.
20, 1974) (text of address by Assistant Attorney General Kauper).
33. The following notice was printed in the preface to the Code as published by
Martindale-Hubbell, Inc.:
SPECIAL NOTICE
Prepaid legal service plans are of fundamental importance to the method and
system by which legal services are delivered. The Association is aware that
certain amendments to the Code of Professional Responsibility adopted in Feb-
mary, 1974, may raise complex questions of constitutional and statutory law.
These amendments are now being studied and appropriate recommendations
will be made to the Association's House of Delegates at the earliest possible
date . . . . Therefore, the House of Delegates suggests to all interested en-
tities that further action on the amendments to the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility involving Disciplinary Rules 2-103 and 2-104 and Ethical Consid-
eration 2-33 be taken only with the knowledge that the matter is now being
studied and will be further considered by the Association.
ABA CODE ii (1974). See ABA, SUMMARY OF ACTiON AND REPORTS TO THE HoUsn OF
DELEGATES, 1974 ANNUAL MEETING 8 (Action of the House in lieu of the recommenda-
tion of the Special Committee on Prepaid Legal Services).
34. See ABA SUMMARY OF ACnON OF THE HousE OF DELEGATES, 1975 MDYvmt
MEETING 4-8 (Action of the House on recommendations of the Ad Hoc Study Group on
Legal Services, Report No. 110) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Amendments].
35. DR 2-103 (D) (4) (a), Chicago Amendments, quoted in note 43 infra.
36. Such organization. . . is so . . . operated that. . . if the organization is
organized for profit, the legal services are not rendered by lawyers employed,
directed, supervised or selected by it except in connection with matters where
such organization bears ultimate liability of its member or beneficiary.
Id. (emphasis added). The exception permits liability insurance companies to use their
own counsel in litigation for the insured. It apparently has no other practical applica-
tion.
37. DR 2-103(D) (4) (b), (c), Chicago Amendments, quoted in note 43 infra.
38. DR 2-101(B):
A lawyer shall not publicize himself. . . as a lawyer through. . . commercial
publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf. How-
ever, a lawyer recommended by, paid by or whose legal services are furnished
by, a qualified legal assistance organization [defined by Definition 8 as an or-
ganization authorized by DR 2-101(D)(1)-(4)] may authorize or permit or
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this provision, apparently only closed panel plans may use advertising
that mentions a particular lawyer or firm. Finally, the plan must
provide:
appropriate relief for any member . . . who asserts a claim that repre-
sentation by counsel furnished, selected, or approved would be unethi-
cal, improper or inadequate under the circumstances of the matter in-
volved. 39
This provision can be interpreted in a way that would convert closed
panel plans into open panel plans; the organization may be required to
refund the amount that the plan's attorney would have been paid
whenever the member seeks outside counsel.40 A different interpreta-
tion is possible, however. The phrase, "improper or inadequate under
the circumstances,' is ambiguous; it could be read to require a refund
only when the organization is unable to provide services that it hadS42
contracted to provide. Thus, the effect of the phrase may vary with
the interpretation it is given in disciplinary proceedings or in the opin-
ions of bar association ethics committees.
assist such organization to use means of dignified commercial publicity, which
does not identify any lawyer by name, to describe the availability or nature
of its legal services or legal service benefits. This rule does not prohibit lim-
ited and dignified identification of a lawyer as a lawyer as well as by name:
(6) In communications by a qualified legal assistance organization ... di-
rected to a member or beneficiary of such organization.
Chicago Amendments (emphasis added). See also DR 2-103(C):
A lawyer shall not request a person or organization to recommend or promote
the use of his services. . . as a private practitioner, except that:
(2) He may cooperate with the legal service activities of any of the offices
or organizations enumerated in DR 2-103(D)(1) through (4) and may
perform legal services for those to whom he was recommended by it to
do such work if:
(a) The person to whom the recommendation is made is a member or
beneficiary of such office or organization.
Id.
39. DR 2-103(D)(4)(e), Chicago Amendments; see note 43 infra.
40. Cf. DR 2-103 (D) (5) (a) (v), Houston Amendments, quoted in note 27 supra.
41. Assuming that "unethical" is limited to direct violation of the Disciplinary
Rules, interpretation of that word is not problematic. A broader interpretation of
"unethical" would be inconsistent with the function of the Disciplinary Rules as
mandatory minimum standards. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
42. Under this reading, the rule provides the same relief otherwise available in an
action for breach of contract. It is unlikely that the phrase was inserted merely to
codify existing law; however, it may have been intended to guarantee that the consumer
was aware of his rights. In this view the relevant phrase is "and the plan provides an
appropriate procedure for seeking such relief." See note 39 supra and accompanying
text.
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The remainder of the provisions of the Chicago Amendments apply
equally to open and closed panel plans,43 and are regulatory, not prohib-
43. The organizational restrictions are contained in DR 2-103:
DR 2-103 Recommendation of Professional Employment
(B) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or
organization to recommend or secure his employment by a client, or as
a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in his employment
by a client, except that he may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues
charged by any of the organizations listed in DR 2-103(D).
(C) A lawyer shall not request a person or organization to recommend or
promote the use of his services or those of his partner or associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a private practitioner,
except that
(1) He may request referrals from a lawyer referral service operated,
sponsored, or approved by a bar association and may pay its fees
incident thereto.(2) He may cooperate with the legal service activities of any of the of-
fices or organizations enumerated in DR 2-103(D)(1) through (4)
and may perform legal services for those to whom he was recom-
mended by it to do such work if:
(a) The person to whom the recommendation is made is a member
or beneficiary of such office or organization; and
(b) The lawyer remains free to exercise his independent profes-
sional judgment on behalf of his client.
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that fur-
nishes or pays for legal services to others to promote the use of his serv-
ices or those of his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm except as permitted in DR 2-101(B). However,
this does not prohibit a lawyer or his partner or associate or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm from being recommended, em-
ployed or paid by, or cooperating with, one of the following offices or
organizations that promote the use of his services or those of his partner
or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm if there
is no interference with the exercise of independent professional judgment
in behalf of his client:
(1) A legal aid office or public defender office:
(a) Operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school.(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide nonprofit community or-
ganization.
(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency.(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association.
(2) A military legal assistance office.
(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar
association.
(4) Any bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes or pays for
legal services to its members or beneficiaries provided the following
conditions are satisfied:
(a) Such organization, including any affiliate, is so organized and
operated that no profit is derived by it from the rendition of
legal services by lawyers, and that, if the organization is or-
ganized for profit, the legal services are not rendered by law-
yers employed, directed, supervised or selected by it except in
connection with matters where such organization bears ultimate
liability of its member or beneficiary.
(b) Neither the lawyer, nor his partner, nor associate, nor any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, nor any non-
lawyer, shall have initiated or promoted such organization for
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itive. Ethical Consideration 2-33, as amended, encourages attorney
participation in prepaid legal services.44 The Code of Professional
Responsibility must be adopted by the jurisdiction for disciplinary ac-
tions to be based on it. Although 47 states have adopted the Code by
statute or rule of court,45 not all have adopted all the subsequent
amendments. Therefore, ethical regulation of attorney participation in
prepaid plans currently falls into the three patterns of the 1969 Code,46
the Houston Amendments, 47 and the Chicago Amendments.48
the primary purpose of providing financial or other benefit to
such lawyer, partner, associate or affiliated lawyer.
(c) Such organization is not operated for the purpose of procuring
legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a private prac-
titioner outside of the legal services program of the organiza-
tion.
(d) The member or beneficiary to whom the legal services are fur-
nished, and not such organization, is recognized as the client
of the lawyer in the matter.
(e) Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal serv-
ices furnished or paid for by the organization may, if such
member or beneficiary so desires, select counsel other than that
furnished, selected or approved by the organization for the par-
ticular matter involved; and the legal service plan of such or-
ganization provides appropriate relief for any member or bene-
ficiary who asserts a claim that representation by counsel fur-
nished, selected or approved would be unethical, improper or in-
adequate under the circumstances of the matter involved and
the plan provides an appropriate procedure for seeking such re-
lief.
(f) The lawyer does not know or have cause to know that such or-
ganization is in violation of applicable laws, rules of court and
other legal requirements that govern its legal service operations.
(g) Such organization has filed with the appropriate disciplinary au-
thority at least annually a report with respect to its legal serv-
ice plan, if any, showing its terms, its schedule of benefits, its
subscription charges, agreements with counsel, and financial re-
sults of its legal service activities or, if it has failed to do so,
the lawyer does not know or have cause to know of such fail-
ure.
Chicago Amendments (footnotes omitted).
44. See EC 2-33, id., quoted in note 110 infra.
45. Hearings on the Organized Bar, supra note 6, at 1 (statement of Sen. Tunney).
46. Ellen Broadman, Legal Research Associate of the Resource Center for Consum-
ers of Legal Services in Washington, D.C., reports that 24 states regulate prepaid legal
services under the 1969 Code.
47. Kansas, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Vermont have
adopted the Houston Amendments. Id.
48. Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, and Tennessee have adopted the Chicago Amendments. Id.
Some states regulate prepaid legal services under provisions that do not fit within the
1969 Code or any of its subsequent amendments. These states are Alabama, California,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon, Virginia, Washington, and
Wisconsin. Id. Disciplinary Rules 20 and 23 of the State Bar of California are similar
in effect to the Houston Amendments. See BNA ANnTrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No.
1023
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B. Promotion of Open Panel Prepaid Legal Services
Although the Code was amended in 1974 to permit open panel
prepaid legal service plans, mere removal of restrictions was not suffi-
cient for such plans to become widespread. Consumers generally prefer
the lower cost of closed panel plans, and insurance plans, though open
panel, are not widely available. Bar associations have attempted to
counter this lack of interest by sponsoring open panel plans and by
forming organizations to stimulate interest in such plans. Two such ef-
forts will be described below.
The State Bar of California, pursuant to enabling legislation 40 has
organized a corporation to administer a state-wide open panel prepaid
legal service plan.50 The corporation, known as California Lawyers'
Service (CLS), is controlled by the State Bar. Any member of the State
Bar may participate. The plan contemplates that groups will negotiate
with CLS to determine the amount that beneficiaries will pay. Negotia-
tion will start with a minimum "targef' hourly rate computed from a
relative value schedule independently compiled by Price Waterhouse &
Co. from empirical data.5 1 The CLS program has not to date com-
menced operations due to refusal of the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice to grant CLS a favorable business review letter.5 2
The ABA has authorized formation of a not-for-profit corporation to
be known as the American Prepaid Legal Services Institute. 8 The
Institute will not administer plans;"4 rather, its corporate purpose is to
promote and co-ordinate all types of prepaid plans.Y5 The fact that a
677, at E-1, E-2 (Aug. 20, 1974) (text of address by Asst. Att'y Gen. Kauper); id. at D-
5 (text of Business Review Letter of California Lawyers' Service).
49. CAL. CoRe. CODE § 9201.2 (Deering Supp. 1975).
50. See Text of Request for Business Review Letter Submitted by California
Lawyers' Service Concerning Prepaid Legal Services and Justice Department Response,
BNA ANTmusr & TRADE Rao. REP. No. 677, at D-1 to D-5 (Aug. 8, 1974).
51. Id.
52. See note 4 supra. The Department's objections center on control of the CLS
program by the bar, cf. notes 142-53 infra and accompanying text, and provisions of the
state ethical code discriminating against closed panel plans, see notes 78-100 infra and
accompanying text.
53. See ABA, SUMMARY OF ACTION AND REPORTS TO ma HousE OF DELEoATES.
1974 MDYEAR MEETINo 3-4 (Action of the House on the first recommendation of the
Special Committee on Prepaid Legal Services).
54. As originally proposed, the Institute would have administered plans. See 38
UNAUTHORIZED PRAcT. NEws No. 1, at 19 (1974) (proposed bylaws).
55. See Report of the Special Committee on Prepaid Legal Services at 4, in ABA,
supra note 53 (No. 120).
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majority of the directors will be ABA nominees,"e however, creates a
strong probability that the Institute will concentrate primarily on stimu-
lating development of open panel plans.5
Ill. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
Four provisions of the federal antitrust laws may be applicable to
activities of the organized bar.58 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohib-
its "[elvery contract, combination . . .or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States." 59  Section 2 of the
Sherman Act makes it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize
. . . or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several states."" Section 7 of
the Clayton Act provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall . .. [merge with an-
other], where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly. 61
Finally, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits
"[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce."6  Al-
though all of these provisions are arguably applicable, only section 1 of
the Sherman Act has been applied to the organized bar to date."
56. The Institute will have thirteen directors-seven nominated by the ABA, three
nominated by open panel plans, and three nominated by closed panel plans. See Ameri-
can Prepaid Legal Services Institute By-Laws, Article Five, in Report, supra note 55
(Exhibit 1), as amended by Action of the House, supra note 53.
57. See generally Official Transcript of ABA House of Delegates Debate on
Amendments to Code of Professional Responsibility, Houston, Texas, February 4, 1974,
reprinted in Hearings, supra note 3 1, at 54.
58. All antitrust statutes do not apply. The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-
13b (1970), would not apply because it deals with price discrimination "between ...
purchasers of commodities" or "in respect of a sale of goods." Id. at § 13(a). Likewise,
oction 3 of the Clayton Act refers only to "commodities." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
Certain aspects of the practice of law have been held to be "trade or commerce," see
notes 170-181 infra and accompanying text, but it is unlikely that legal services will
become "commodities" or "goods." But cf. Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical
Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 638, 237 P.2d 737, 765 (1951) (holding prepaid medical
services "products" within meaning of antitrust provisions of state constitution).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Section 3 of the Sherman Act makes similar activities
illegal in the District of Columbia. Id. § 3.
60. Id. § 2.
61. Id. § 18.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. IV, 1974).
63. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); United States v.
Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974).
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Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar6" is the only Supreme Court case
that has examined antitrust liability of bar associations. The Goldfarbs
needed a title search to obtain real estate financing; only a member of
the Virginia bar was authorized to conduct the search. 5 Although the
Goldfarbs contacted 27 attorneys, none would perform the search for
less than the minimum fee set by the county bar association. The
Goldfarbs brought suit against the state and county bar associations for
an injunction and treble damages, alleging that the minimum fee sched-
ule was a trade restraint prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act. °0
The Supreme Court saw the issue as limited to "whether the Sher-
man Act applies to services performed by attorneys in examining
titles in connection with financing the purchase of real estate. ' ' 07  Nev-
ertheless, in holding that the Sherman Act did apply, the Court dis-
cussed many issues presented by restraints on prepaid legal services.
These issues will be discussed below. First, possible theories of anti-
trust liability under each of the applicable antitrust statutes will be
isolated, followed by a short description of antitrust remedies. Next,
jurisdiction of the federal antitrust laws over restrictions on prepaid legal
services will be analyzed. Finally, theories under which bar associa-
tions may claim immunity from antitrust liability will be discussed.
A. Theories of Liability
1. Section ] of the Sherman Act
Literal interpretation of section 1 of the Sherman Act would invali-
date every ordinary contract, since every contract restrains trade by
limiting the commercial freedom of the contracting parties. Such an
interpretation would be constitutionally unsound,68 but the statute pro-
vides no clue of the test by which the legality of a restraint may be
judged. 69 Early in the history of the Act, Chief Justice White's opinion
in Standard Oil Co. v. United States70 provided the necessary guideline:
[T]he criteria to be resorted to in any given case for the purpose of
ascertaining whether violations of the section have been committed, is
64. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
65. Id. at 775, citing Unauthorized Practice of Law Opinion No. 17, Aug. 5, 1942,
VmGiNIA STATE BAR--OPINIONS 239 (1965).
66. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973), rev'd,
497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
67. 421 U.S. at 780.
68. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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the rule of reason guided by the established law and by the plain duty
to enforce the prohibitions of the act and thus the public policy which
its restrictions were obviously enacted to subserve. 71
The public policy behind the Act is prevention of the evils of monopoly
power-price fixing, limiting production, and "deterioration in quality
of the monopolized article." 72  Under the "rule of reason," liability is
incurred only if a particular restraint is an "undue restraint."73  Then
Professor Bork explained that the rule permits restraints when their
anticompetitive effects are outweighed by their beneficial commercial
results, such as increased availability of goods to the consumer through
greater production or efficiency.74 Nevertheless, the Court has deter-
71. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 52. A frequently cited statement of antitrust policy was given by Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America:
Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens
initiative, discourages thrift, and depresses energy; that immunity from compe-
tition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the
spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to
let well enough alone .... [Moreover, in enacting the antitrust laws Congress]
was not necessarily actuated by economic motives alone. It is possible, be-
cause of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small produc-
ers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and character, to one
in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few.
148 F.2d 416. 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
Clearly, the major policy goal of antitrust laws is the preservation of competition.
Other goals include maximizing the use of economic resources, preventing unfair trade
practices, and discouraging concentration of economic power. These principles are broad
and readily applied to the practice of law. See, e.g., Note, A Critical Analysis of Bar
Association Minimum Fee Schedules, 85 HAv. L. REv. 971, 974-81 (1972); Note, The
Wisconsin Minimum Fee Schedule: A Problem of Antitrust, 1968 WIs. L. REv. 1237. In
the economic sense, an attorney merely sells services such as the title search in Goldfarb.
See 421 U.S. at 787. The antitrust laws have long been held applicable to the sale of
services. Id. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957);
United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 491 (1950);
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
73. 221 U.S. at 60 (emphasis added).
74. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 375-76 (1966) (pt. 2); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the
Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 776, 833-34 (1965)
(pt. I ). Courts generally state the rule formulated by Justice Brandeis:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely reg-
ulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not be-
cause a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation, or the
reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts
and to predict consequences.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see, e.g., United States
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mined certain forms of restraint to be so anticompetitive that their
presence will foreclose evidence of reasonableness.
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their per-
nicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are con-
clusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use.75
These restraints, illegal per se, include group boycotts70 and price
fixing.77
a. Boycott
The 1970 Code virtually prohibits attorney participation in prepaid
legal services plans. 78 The Houston Amendments prohibit participation
v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972); White Motor Co. v. United States, 272
U.S. 253, 262 (1963). For examples of use of the rule of reason to uphold restraints,
see Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 333-35 (1961) (requirements
contract); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 373-78 (1933) (joint
selling agent); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239-41 (1918)
(exchange rule fixing price of grain "to arrive" at final bid in day's auction).
75. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The Court listed
price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangments as activities that
are illegal per se. Id. For similar statements of the absolute presumption of unreasona-
bleness with per se violations, see United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351
U.S. 305, 309-10 (1956); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212-14 (1940).
76. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966)
(concerted action to prevent dealers from selling cars through discount stores); Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 347 (1963) (rule prohibiting members from
transmitting information over private wires to nonmembers); Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659 (1961) (association composed of
utilities and manufacturers of gas burners refused to grant "seal of approval" to plaintiff's
appliance; utilities would not connect gas to the appliance without a seal); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (arrangement with distributors
not to sell, or to sell only at unfavorable terms, to competitor); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 11-12, 19 (1945) (association bylaws "on their face, and
without regard to their past effect, constitute restraints of trade"); Fashion Originators'
Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (association members refused to sell to retailers who
sold lower-priced copies of their original designs). See generally Barber, Refusals to
Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. Rav. 847 (1955); Rahl, Per se
Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on the Klor's Case, 45 VA.
L. R v. 1165 (1959); Note, A Re-examination of the Boycott Per Se Rule in Antitrust
Law, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 126 (1974).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212-14 (1940);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
78. See ABA CoD, DR 2-103(D) (5), 2-103(E), discussed in notes 20-21 supra and
accompanying text.
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in closed panel plans that do not meet stringent requirements.7" The
Chicago Amendments prohibit participation in closed panel plans spon-
sored by most profit making organizations.8 0 All are, in effect, boy-
cotts"1 of the proscribed plans. Therefore, under the per se analysis all
are illegal.8 2 Antitrust liability was sustained by the Supreme Court in
American Medical Association v. United States83 under similar facts.
The AMA's code of ethics prohibited physician participation, on a
salaried basis, in prepaid medical service plans. 84  The Court held that:
Whether the conspiracy was aimed at restraining or destroying competi-
tion, or had as its purpose a restraint of the free availability of medical
or hospital services in the market . . . [it was] within the scope of the
statute s 5
Nevertheless, there is some evidence in the Goldfarb opinion that per
se rules may not be automatically applied to bar associations. In a
footnote to its holding that sale of a title search is a "business aspect" of
an attorney's practice and therefore "commerce, '86 the Court stated:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that par-
ticular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to
79. See DR 2-103(D)(5), 2-103(E), Definition 8, Houston Amendments, discussed
in notes 21, 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
80. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
81. A boycott is a "group action to coerce," or concerted refusal to deal. REPORT
OF ns UNYTED STATES AIrrORNEY GENERAL'S NAnONAL COMMITrEE TO STUDY TiE
ANrrrruST LAWS 133 (1955). For example, a boycott was found where:
[Tihe combination exercised sufficient control and power in the women's
garments and textile businesses "to exclude from the industry those manu-
facturers and distributors who do not conform to the rules and regulations of
said respondents, and thus tend to create in themselves a monopoly in the said
industries."
Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466-67 (1941).
82. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
83. 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (upholding criminal antitrust conviction by jury).
84. Id. at 526. The AMA was charged with attempting:
"(I) to impose restraints on physicians affiliated with Group Health by threat
of expulsion or actual expulsion from the societies; (2) to deny them the es-
sential professional contacts with other physicians; and (3) to use the coercive
power of the societies to deprive them of hospital facilities for their patients."
id. at 532, quoting United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 711 (D.C.
Cir. 1940).
85. Id. at 529, citing Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941),
quoted in note 74 supra. The lower court gave a detailed discussion of the liability
lasues, including an analogy to the practice of law. See American Medical Ass'n v.
United States, 130 F.2d 233, 244-51 (D. C. Cir. 1942), affd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). Cf.
United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 339-40 (1952).
86. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 785 (1975).Washington University Open Scholarship
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view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business
activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust con-
cepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and
other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any
other situation than the one with which we are confronted today.87
The Court's language may be interpreted in three ways. Under the first
view, the language merely complements the Court's later assurances that
the power of the state to regulate its professions remains unimpaired.""
If this view is correct, the anticompetitive activity is protected only by
the Parker state action doctrine.89 Thus, a private restraint unduly
restricting competition would be illegal under the rule of reason regard-
less of its ethical foundation. This reading is consistent with the general
rule that a beneficial noncommercial purpose is irrelevant to the ques-
tion of antitrust liability since the rule of reason is used only to deter-
mine whether an undue commercial restraint exists.90 But it is incon-
87. Id. at 787-88 n.17 (emphasis added). It is arguable that the Supreme Court in
Goldfarb was applying the rule of reason to price fixing, a per se violation. The district
court in Goldfarb held that if the antitrust laws applied, the fee schedules were per se
illegal. 355 F. Supp. 491, 493 (E.D. Va. 1973). The Fourth Circuit did not disagree.
See 497 F.2d 1, 20 (4th Cir. 1974) (Craven, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). But the Supreme Court did not mention the per se rule. Instead, it analyzed the ef-
fect of the fee schedules on the consumer, arguably applying the rule of reason to hold
the restraint illegal. See 421 U.S. at 781-83. Nevertheless, since the Court did not ex-
pressly use the rule of reason, and in fact called the fee schedule a "classic illustration of
price fixing," id. at 783, Goldfarb is readily viewed as a per se case. See United States
v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp. 457, 460-61 (D.D.C. 1975) (per
se). See also United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507, 516 (D. Ore. 1974);
Rigler, supra note 4, at 190-91.
88. [Tjhe States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions . . .
they have broad powers to establish standards for licensing practitioners and
regulating the practice of professions. . . . [7]he State may decide that "...
competition . . . may be demoralizing . ... " . . . The interest of the
States in regulating lawyers is especially great . . . . We intend no diminu-
tion of the authority of the State to regulate its professions.
Id. at 792-93, quoting United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
89. See notes 232-77 infra and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972), United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967), Sugar Institute, Inc. v.
United States, 297 U.S. 553, 599 (1936).
One commentator, labeling "good motives" as a "false issue," states that if a restraint
were shown to cause a very great lessening of competition . . . I it would be
no defense to show that the purposes were laudable. And even if the arrange-
ment were greatly beneficial to the national interest in lower prices, better
quality, military defense, full employment, foreign trade, health and safety,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/4
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sistent with the Court's indication that the legal profession may "be
treated differently," since the Parker doctrine applies in all cases.
Second, one commentator has suggested that the language indicates
that noncommercial professional restraints are exempt from the antitrust
laws.91 This proposed noncommercial exemption depends, however, on
a questionable reading of the legislative intent of the commerce require-
ment of the Sherman Act.92 Moreover, it is not useful for analysis.
Since an antitrust complaint is unlikely to occur unless the restraint has
a commercial effect, the exemption would have to depend on noncom-
mercial purpose to be meaningful. But antitrust exemptions always are
narrowly construed. 93 A court applying the proposed exemption there-
fore would first examine the restraint to see if it was narrowly drawn to
fulfill the asserted beneficial purpose and then determine whether the
beneficial purpose justified an apparent antitrust violation 94-- essentially
applying the modified rule of reason approach described below.
Under the third view, the Court's emphasis on "the public service
aspect" of the practice of law indicates that one factor in the rule of
good morals, and exploration of outer space, it would still be illegal under the
rule of reason as that rule has evolved.
Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing Rule-Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw.
U.L. REv. 137, 146-47 (1962).
91. Rigler, supra note 4, at 189. Rigler suggests that noncommercial restraints have
total exemption, but commercial restraints are subject to the per se rules. Id. at 189. See
also Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. L. REV. 705
(1962). But see Note, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and
Other "Non-Commercial" Activities, supra note 4, at 317-18, 325-27.
The noncommercial exemption has been applied by one court. See Marjorie Webster
Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d
650, 653-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); cf. Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 25-29 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Apex Hosiery Co.
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 500-04 (1940); United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp.
507, 516 (D. Ore. 1974).
92. See notes 170-73 infra and accompanying text. See also notes 189-97 infra and
accompanying text.
93. For example, the Court will imply an antitrust exemption from a federal
regulatory scheme "only if necessary to make the.. . Act work, and even then only to
the minimum extent necessary." Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357
(1963). See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973). If
regulators empowered to approve actions that they find to be in the "public interest" do
not weigh the potential harm to competition, the approved action is still subject to
antitrust liability. See, e.g., Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973); Denver
& R.G.W.R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485 (1967); United States v. First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
94. See Coons, supra note 91, at 747; cf. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S.
341, 361 (1963).
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reason analysis must be whether the restraint has the purpose and effect
of protecting the public from unscrupulous practices. Since this
approach is a radical departure from the usual practice under the rule of
reason,90 it should be used, if at all, only upon a showing that the
anticompetitive ethical restraint is essential to protect the public. This
approach to the rule of reason would balance the anticompetitive effect
against the ethical need.
The effects of Code restrictions on closed panel prepaid legal service
plans are clearly anticompetitive. First, the negotiated fees of closed
panel plans are lower than fees charged under conventional or open
panel forms of delivery. Analogous closed panel prepaid medical serv-
ice plans operate at two-thirds the cost of traditional forms of med-
ical care.9 7 By eliminating the closed panel alternative, the Code
rules keep the price of legal services at a level considerably higher than
the price would be if such plans were generally available. 8 In addition,
since persons of moderate income may not be able to afford traditional
fees but could manage payments under a prepaid plan, the rules tend to
limit the supply of legal services available to the middle class. 0 Finally,
95. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757
& n.9 (2d Cir. 1975).
96. See note 90 supra and accompanying text. The Court usually responds to public
policy arguments by stating that exemptions from the antitrust laws must come from
Congress, not the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596,
611-12 (1972).
97. See Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care
Crisis, 84 HARv. L. RaV. 887, 921-27 (1971).
98. See PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 5, at 179-80 (statement of J. Bern-
stein); Bartosic & Bernstein, Group Legal Services as a Fringe Benefit: Lawyers for
Forgotten Clients Through Collective Bargaining, 59 VA. L. REv. 410, 428-33 (1973).
99. Studies indicate that consumer use of legal services increases when prepaid plans
become available. See F. MARKS, R. HALLAVER & R. CLIFTON, supra note 7. The studies
are summarized in C. LILLY, LEGAL SaVIcES FOR THE MDDLE MARKET 1-18 (1974).
They do not, however, conclusively demonstrate that the expansion in use would be sig-
nificant. PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 171-72 (statement of P. Stolz). In addition, since the
majority of lawyers are solo or small practitioners dependent on low and middle income
clients, they may be hurt by expansion of prepaid plans. See Ells, The Primrose Path for
Lawyers, 36 UNAUTH. PRACr. NEWS No. 3, at 1 (1972). See generally B. CHRISTENSEN,
LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS (1970); C. LILLY, supra; Hearings on H.R.
77 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., 126-82 (1973) (Prepaid Legal Services Report of the Special Com-
mittee of the State Bar of California); Hayes, Delivery Systems for Legal Services-
Prepaid Legal Services and Prepaid Legal Insurance, 40 INS. COUNSEL J. 414 (1973);
ef. EC 2-1, 2-24 ABA CODE.
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by eliminating a competing form of delivery of legal services, the re-
strictions prevent the stimulus for improvement that competition can
provide.1"' The effects of the boycott of closed panel prepaid legal
services on the price, quantity, and quality of legal services run contrary
to the strong policy of the Sherman Act.101
The Code restrictions on prepaid legal services are intended to
prevent solicitation and to maintain the independence, integrity,
and competence of the bar.102 But, to outweigh anticompetitive
effect, "mere labels" will not suffice;' the restrictions must be shown
actually to further these policy goals.' 04 Solicitation of employment
after a cause of action arises ("ambulance chasing") tends to stir up
litigation and is said to lead to spurious claims, bribery, destruction of
100. Lawyers have been slow to utilize techniques that increase efficiency. For
example, though a large part of the activities of a lawyer consist basically of information
retrieval, use of computers to assist in that function only recently has been developing.
See generally Sprowl, Computer-Assisted Legal Research-An Analysis of Full-Text
Document Retrieval Systems, Particularly the LEXIS System, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 175. Were competing forms of delivery allowed, it is reasonable to believe
that such advances would be adopted more quickly with lower costs to the consumer
resulting.
101. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
102. E.g.,
The basic tenets of the profession, according to EC 1-1 are independence, in-
tegrity and competence of the lawyer and total devotion to the interests of the
client. There is substantial danger that lawyers rendering services under legal
service plans which do not permit the beneficiaries to select their own attorneys
will not be able to meet these standards. The independence of the lawyer may
be seriously affected by the fact that he is employed by the group and by virtue
of that employment cannot give his full devotion to the interest of the member
he represents. The group which employs the attorney will inevitably have the
characteristic of a 'lay intermediary' because of its control over the attorney
inherent in the employment relationship. It is probably [sic] that attorneys
employed by groups will be directed as to what cases they may handle and in
the manner in which they handle the cases referred to them. It is also possible
that the standards of the profession and quality of legal service to the public
will suffer because consideration for economy rather than experience and com-
petence will determine the attorneys to be employed by the group. An attor-
ney interested in maintaining the historic traditions of the profession and pre-
serving the function of a lawyer as a trusted and independent advisor to indi-
vidual members of society should carefully consider the risks involved before
accepting employment by groups under plans which do not provide their mem-
bers with a free choice of counsel.
EC 2-33, Houston Amendments (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
103. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
104. Cf. Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 602-
03, 605-08, 237 P.2d 737, 746-49 (1951).
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public confidence in the bar, and poor service to the client.10 In open
panel plans, employment is initiated by the client and the traditional
attorney-client relation exists; therefore none of the solicitation objec-
tions can justify the prohibitions of the 1969 Code against all prepaid
service plans. The solicitation objections also appear inapplicable to
closed panel plans. Encouraging a consumer to participate in a plan
that will make legal services, should they become necessary, less expen-
sive is totally dissimilar to ambulance chasing-it does not stir up
dormant litigation. Moreover, since a closed panel plan facilitates
access to legal services, it is more likely to increase than decrease public
confidence in the bar. The severe restraints of the Houston Amend-
ments are therefore not justified by the solicitation objections.
The policies furthering independence, integrity, and competence are
incorporated in other disciplinary rules applied on a case-by-case ba-
sis. o' To justify prohibition of participation in prepaid plans, there
should be a strong showing that the plans present such severe ethical
dangers that rules governing other forms of practice will not suffice. But
the ethical dangers of participation in prepaid legal service plans are no
greater than those faced by a salaried attorney employed by an insurance
company'0 7 and the case-by-case approach is considered sufficient in the
latter instance. The case-by-case method likewise regulates public de-
fenders and legal aid lawyers who are essentially participating in closed
panel prepaid legal service plans sponsored by the state or charity.
Thus, the prohibition of participation in prepaid plans amounts to an
unwarranted conclusive presumption of unethical behavior. 0 The
105. See Note, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U.
CHr. L. REv. 674 (1958) (concluding that the traditional prohibitions are unjustified).
106. Independence is mandated by the Disciplinary Rules under Canon 5: "A Lawyer
Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client," especially
DR 5-107(B):
A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays him
to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his professional judg-
ment in rendering such legal services.
ABA CODE (footnote omitted).
Competence is mandated by Canon 6: "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Compe-
tently." See DR 6-101(A), DR 7-101(A)(1), ABA CODE. Integrity is required by
Canon 1: "A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the
Legal Profession." See DR 1-102(A) (1), (6), ABA CODE.
107. Limitation of insurance liability can create severe conflicts of interest when a
proposed settlement exceeds the limitation. See generally V. COUNTRYMAN & T.
FINMAN, supra note 3, at 96-113.
108. See Feinstein v. Attorney Gen., 36 N.Y.2d 199, 204, 326 N.E.2d 288, 291, 366
N.Y.S.2d 613, 617 (1975); F. MARKS, K. LESWiNG & B. FORTINSKY, supra note 22, at
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/4
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restrictions of the 1969 Code and Houston Amendments are at best
redundant and at worst intentionally anticompetitive;' 0 9 they are not
justified by ethical policies, and have been abandoned in the Chicago
Amendments." 0
188; PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 141 (statement of L. Bernstein); cf. Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364-66 (1963); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 583, 589-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (dicta), aff'd, 518 F.2d
751, 757 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1975) (rejecting Judge Weinstein's dicta).
109. Though the restrictions are asserted to protect the public, they are probably
intended primarily to protect fees from the competition of lower-priced prepaid plans.
Professor Sutton, Reporter of the ABA Committee on Reevaluation of Legal Ethics,
testified that:
Many of the problems [with legal services] . . . are economic problems; they
are problems of financing the delivery of legal services. They are not really
problems of ethics, and we mislabel if we label these matters ethics. I think
that as far as the Code and interpretation of the Code is concerned, the object
is to protect the professional values . . . at the same time avoiding all unneces-
sary roadblocks to new and proper methods of delivering legal services, and
we shouldn't try to bring under the umbrella of ethics many other matters that
do not belong there. It would be a mistake for the ABA to regulate legal serv-
ice plans, in the name of ethics, by regulations that are designed mainly to reg-
ulate the economics of law practice.
Hearings on the Organized Bar, supra note 6, at 32-33 (emphasis added). At the ABA
meeting in Houston, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility after considerable study had recommended regulating open and closed panel plans
equally, but the House of Delegates instead adopted the discriminatory proposals of the
Section of General Practice. See ABA, SUMMARY OF ACTION AND REPORTS TO THE
HousE OF DELEGATES, 1974 ANNUAL MEETING (Report of the Special Committee on
Prepaid Legal Services, Report No. 105). This action provides some evidence that
ethical questions were not the primary consideration motivating adoption of the Houston
Amendments.
If anticompetitive purpose were shown, the rule of reason would provide no protection
from antitrust liability. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 496, 522
(1948).
110. EC 2-33 now reads:
As a part of the legal profession's commitment to the principle that high qual-
ity legal services should be available to all, attorneys are encouraged to coop-
erate with qualified legal assistance organizations providing prepaid legal serv-
ices. Such participation should at all times be in accordance with the basic
tenets of the profession: independence, integrity, competence and devotion to
the interests of individual clients. An attorney so participating should make
certain that his relationship with a qualified legal assistance organization in no
way interferes with his independent, professional representation of the interests
of the individual client. An attorney should avoid situations in which officials
of the organization who are not lawyers attempt to direct attorneys concerning
the manner in which legal services are performed for individual members, and
should also avoid situations in which considerations of economy are given un-
due weight in determining the attorneys employed by an organization or the
legal services to be performed for the member or beneficiary rather than com-
petence and quality of service. An attorney interested in maintaining the his-
toric traditions of the profession and preserving the function of a lawyer as
a trusted and independent advisor to individual members of society should care-
fully assess such factors when accepting employment by, or otherwise partici-
pating in, a particular qualified legal assistance organization, and while so par-Washington University Open Scholarship
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The provision of the Chicago Amendments prohibiting most profit-
making organizations from sponsoring closed panel prepaid plans11' is
defended by the argument that:
The desire to make the highest possible profit from the rendition of legal
services would present too great a temptation to the laymen-controlled
organization to interfere with the independent professional judgment of
an attorney.112
If the organization bears ultimate liability, the Chicago Amendments
permit sponsoring of closed panel plans" 8 because the interests of the
organization and those of the client coincide, eliminating the ethical
problem." 4  But even if the interests of the organization and client do
not coincide, the anticipated unethical behavior is prohibited by other
disciplinary rules." 5 If a case-by-case disciplinary system is not suffi-
cient to prevent abuse, state regulation similar to insurance laws would
be a less restrictive means of protecting the consumer. 10 On balance,
though, the restrictions are not severely anticompetitive-the closed
panel plan is permitted, if only in nonprofit form-and do have some
ethical foundation. 1 7 They may be sustained if a modified rule of rea-
son is adopted." 8
The provision in the Chicago Amendments requiring payment of
outside counsel under certain circumstances does not require an anti-
competitive interpretation;"19 thus, an ethical opinion with anticompeti-
tive effect would not be sustained under the rule of reason.
ticipating should adhere to the highest professional standards of effort and
competence.
Chicago Amendments.
111. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
112. Comment, Group Legal Services, The Ethical Evolution, 27 BAYLOR L. Rv.
527, 540 (1975).
113. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
114. But see note 107 supra.
115. See note 106 supra.
116. Bar spokesmen generally do not use the term "insurance" to describe prepaid
legal services since insurance implies state statutory and administrative requirements that
bar plans may not be able to meet. See PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 22, 63, 127; ci. Note,
supra note 97, at 969-74. See generally C. LILLY, supra note 99, at 189-214. But
amendment of state insurance codes to accommodate the distinctive features of prepaid
legal services is the most direct answer to these problems. See Comment, Texas
Legislation: Prepaid Legal Services, 27 BAYLOR L. Ray. 500 (1975) (the Texas statute is
set out at 631).
117. But see Elson, supra note 31, at 331.
118. See BNA ANTIRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 720, at A-7 (July 1, 1975) (Asst.
Att'y Gen. Wilson).
119. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/4
Vol. 1975:1011] ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
b. Restraints Incorporated in Bar-sponsored Prepaid Plans: Price Fix-
ing
Many prepaid legal service plans use schedules of benefits that set out
the amount of legal services to which the client becomes entitled by his
payments. -120  Such a schedule, if imposed uniformly on all plan mem-
bers, is an overt mechanism fixing the price of the services similar to the
fee schedules that Goldfarb held to be a "classic illustration of price
fixing." 121 Since there appear to be no ethical defenses to price fixing,
the main factor barring liability is that section 1 of the Sherman Act
requires a "contract, combination. . . or conspiracy." 122  An organiza-
tion may unilaterally fix the prices of services it will provide.123  Thus,
if a prepaid plan is viewed as a single entity, the element of agreement
necessary under section 1 is absent. The Department of Justice, how-
ever, argues that the Penn-Olin joint venture theory, 12 4 under which the
plan is viewed as a combination of attorneys providing legal services,
would satisfy this element, at least if the plan represents a significant
portion of the legal market.' 2 5 If the courts accept the Department's
position, antitrust liability could still be avoided by showing that the
schedule of benefits is not a price fixing mechanism. Two methods
have been suggested. First, if consumers participate in arms-length ne-
gotiation of the schedule, the schedule could become part of an ordi-
nary legal contract.'12  Second, if the schedule gives, not the price of
the services, but an accurate empirical calculation of the relative value
of the various services provided, it might be held valid12--absent evi-
120. See DR 2-103(D)(4)(g), Chicago Amendments, set out at note 43 supra
(requiring schedule of benefits to be filed "with the appropriate disciplinary authority").
121. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783 (1975).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
123. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). The power of a
producer to set resale prices is, however, limited. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145, 149-50 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 38-43 (1960).
124. See notes 149-50 infra and accompanying text. The Supreme Court adopted the
theory under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), but found no violation of §
1 of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 161
(1964).
125. See Hearings, supra note 31, at 107 (statement of Dep. Asst. Att'y Gen.
Wilson).
126. PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 141 (Statement of L. Bernstein).
127. A purely advisory fee schedule issued to provide guidelines, or an exchange
of price information without a showing of an actual restraint on trade, would
present us with a different question. ....
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781 (1975). See PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES
142 (statement of L. Bernstein); Hearings, supra note 22, at 171 (statement of Acting
Asst. Att'y Gen. Wilson). Such information should be aggregated by an inde-
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dence showing use of a uniform scale by participating attorneys to con-
vert the relative value schedule into a fee schedule."2
2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize...
any portion of the trade or commerce among the several states" is in
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.120 Bar associations allowing
open panel plans to advertise while restricting advertising of closed
panel plans could violate this section. Under the Houston Amend-
ments, bar-sponsored plans may solicit clients, 130 but closed panel plans
may not. 3 1 The effect is to limit severely consumer knowledge of the
availability of closed panel plans. Under the Chicago Amendments,
any nonprofit organization (including a bar association) may start and
promote a plan 3" but only if:
Neither the lawyer, nor his partner, nor associate, nor any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm, nor any non-lawyer, shall have initiated
or promoted such organization for the primary purpose of providing fi-
nancial or other benefit to such lawyer, partner, associate or affiliated
lawyer.' 33
This provision limits promotion of closed panel plans to preexisting
organizations; a new organization formed solely for the purpose of
sponsoring a closed panel plan could always be viewed as intended
pendent party and not be confidential or accompanied by an agreement in order to mini-
mize antitrust problems. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 704, at A-1, E-1
(Mar. 11, 1975) (Dep. Asst. Att'y Gen. Baker). See generally Herold, Antitrust Implica-
tions of Statistical Reporting by Trade Associations: Cost Indexing in an Inflationary
Economy, 26 MERCER L. REv. 951 (1975).
128. See United States v. American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, No. 75-4640
(S.D.N.Y., filed Sept. 22, 1975), described in BNA ANTITRUST & ThADE REG. REP. No.
732, at A-16 (Sept. 30, 1975) (antitrust action under theory that relative value guides
"have effect of raising, fixing, stabilizing, and maintaining fees").
129. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
130. DR 2-103(D) (4) and Definition 8 combine to make a bar-sponsored plan a
"qualified legal assistance organization;" DR 2-104(A) (2) allows lawyers to promote
"qualified legal assistance organizations." Houston Amendments. See notes 24-25, 28
supra.
131. Closed panel plans are not "qualified legal assistance organizations" under
Definition 8 and thus cannot be promoted. DR 2-104(A), Houston Amendments. See
notes 25, 28 supra.
132. See DR 2-103(D)(1)(a), (1)(d), (3), (4)(a), Chicago Amendments, quoted
in note 43 supra.
133. DR 2-103(D)(4)(b), Chicago Amendments. See also DR 2-103(D)(4)(c),
id., quoted in note 43 supra.
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primarily to benefit the attorneys hired by the plan. Thus, knowledge
of closed panel plans would be limited to members of organizations
existing for other purposes. It is forseeable that many individuals
would join open panel plans not knowing of the closed panel alternative.
Such restrictions on advertising may be viewed as an attempt to monop-
olize the market for nongroup legal services.1 3 4
In United States v. Griffith,135 the Court stated that:
It is indeed "unreasonable per se to foreclose competitors from any sub-
stantial market.". . . The antitrust laws are as much violated by the
prevention of competition as by its destruction. . . . It follows a
fortiori that the use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to
foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a
competitor, is unlawful. 136
The Court has held that control of advertising, if abused, can violate
section 2.1317
Despite the strong language of the Griffith case, a modified rule of
reason, if adopted, would be applied in section 2 as in section 1.138 The
anticompetitive effect is clear.'39 The Houston Amendments appear
134. Monopolization cases often turn on how large the court draws.the relevant
market which is the area of anticompetitive activity. Here, if the relevant market
included all legal services, the anticompetitive effect would be minimal. See United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 585 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting). If the
relevant market included only nongroup prepaid legal services, the anticompetitive effect
would be enormous. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966)
(majority opinion). See generally SECTION OF ANTrrRusT LAw, ABA, ANTrrRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 47-52 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ANrmuS'T LAW DEVELOPMENTS].
135. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
136. Id. at 107 (citations omitted).
137. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (newspaper
violates § 2 by refusing to accept advertising from customers that also advertise on new
radio station):
[lt seems clear that if all the newspapers in a city, in order to monopolize
the dissemination of news and advertising by eliminating a competing radio
station, conspired to accept no advertisements from anyone who advertised over
that station, they would violate §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act. . . . It is
consistent with that result to hold here that a single newspaper, already enjoy-
ing a substantial monopoly in its area, violates the "attempt to monopolize"
clause of § 2 when it uses its monopoly to destroy threatened competition.
Id. at 154 (footnote and citations omitted).
138. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-62 (1911); notes 95-96
supra and accompanying text.
139. See BNA ANrrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. No. 713, at A-11 (May 13, 1975)
(statement of J. Simes, Antitrust Division attorney); cf. DNA ANiurlwsT & TRADE REo.
REP. No. 715, at A-19 (May 27, 1975) (statement of FTC Chmn. Engman). Other
advertising rules regulating law lists are under constitutional attack. See Consumers
Union v. American Bar Ass'n, Civil No. 75-0105-R (E.D. Va., filed Feb. 27, 1975)
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indefensible, since they rest on irrebuttable presumptions of unethical
acts.'40 The Chicago Amendments, however, may be found reason-
able because they seem only to prohibit direct solicitation for private
practice-an activity long assumed to be unethical. But the solicitation
rationale does not withstand close analysis.' 4 '
3. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act states:
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly, or indi-
rectly. . . another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect. . . may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 142
Section 7 "was intended to arrest anticompetitive activities in their
'incipiency' 143 by preventing merger of competitors. Prepaid legal
service plans are easily combined, 144 and the evidence indicates that the
competitors are sufficiently concentrated for the Clayton Act to ap-
ply.' 45  In 1972, for example, 27 firms accounted for 75 percent of the
prepaid plans in California; three firms accounted for 30 percent of the
market.14 6
The ABA has authorized formation of a national corporation to
promote prepaid legal service plans;147 state and local bar associations
have formed corporations to administer prepaid plans.14 8  Although
(challenging DR 2-102(A) (6) as violating the first and fourteenth amendments); cf.
note 303 infra and accompanying text. The 1976 Philadelphia Amendments liberalized
the law list rules and may moot the constitutional litigation. See note 306 infra and
accompanying text.
140. See notes 106-10 supra and accompanying text.
141. See notes 105-06 supra and accompanying text. The argument can be extended to
the point that general advertising by lawyers, a practice traditionally condemned, would
not be within the ethical prohibition. This is a line-drawing problem. But if no public
harm can be shown from dignified, accurate commercial publicity, the antitrust laws may
eventually require the bar to permit such publicity. The 1976 Philadelphia Amendments
permit limited advertising by lawyers in the yellow pages of telephone directories. See
note 306 infra and accompanying text.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
143. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
144. See PRPAIn LE AL SERVICES 45-46 (statement of R. Duane).
145. See AN=iTRUsT LAW DEVELOPMENTS 74-76.
146. 36 UNAUTH. PRACT. NEWS No. 3, at 9 (1972); see also PREPAID LEaAL SnxvwcEs
47-51 (statement of L. Weller) (ten percent of firms control 50 percent of group plans).
147. See notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text.
148. See Note, Developments in California Private Legal Services Plans, supra note
4, at 181-87. See also notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text.
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such proposals create a new organization instead of combining existing
ones, they may violate section 7 under the theory approved by the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.149
In Penn-Olin, two large existing corporations formed a new joint
venture to produce a chemical that neither previously had marketed.
The Court held that this combination could violate section 7, since both
companies could have entered the market as competitors, or one might
have entered alone while the other remained as potential competition
at the edge of the market.1 0 Under the Penn-Olin theory, a bar-spon-
sored organization large enough "substantially to lessen competition'' 1
by elimination of potential competition'52 may violate section 7.15S
4. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
The "unfair methods of competition" proscribed by section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act'54 include activities that violate the
Sherman and Clayton Acts and activities that are contrary to the poli-
cies of those acts without amounting to actual violations.
When conduct does bear the characteristics of recognized antitrust viola-
tions it becomes suspect, and the Commission may properly look to cases
applying those laws for guidance.' 55
Thus, the FTC may prosecute Clayton Act violations even when the
jurisdictional requirements of the Clayton Act are not met. 56 All the
149. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
150. The Court was also presented with a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act, but
concluded that the record did not show a violation. Id. at 161. Since the Court relied
on the record and did not analyze the joint venture theory in this context, the argument
remains that agreements preceding formation of a new corporation may violate § 1. See
notes 122-25 supra and accompanying text.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
297-331 (1949) (discussing the meaning of "substantially lessen competition" under § 3
of the Clayton Act).
152. Cf. Ohio Medical Indemnity, Inc., Civil No. 2-75-473 (S.D. Ohio, filed July 9,
1975), discussed in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 724, at A-8 (July 29,
1975).
153. Cf. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-38 (1973).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. IV, 1974).
155. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369-70 (1965); accord, Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609 (1953); FTC v. Motion
Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953); FTC v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683, 708 (1948).
156. See United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Corp., 422 U.S. 271, 279 n.7
(1975). This power is important because prepaid legal services may not meet the
jurisdictional requirements of the Clayton Act. See notes 198-217 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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theories of liability discussed under the Sherman and Clayton Acts are
equally applicable to actions brought by the FTC.5 7  Moreover, the
FTC is asserting its regulatory powers over professional activities. Pro-
ceedings have commenced against the AMA's prohibition of advertis-
ing,158 and trade regulation rules' 59 have been proposed that would
preempt state laws' 60 prohibiting price advertising by pharmacists' 0"
and opticians.'6 2
B. Remedies
Persons injured by violations of the Sherman or Clayton Act can
obtain injunctions and recover treble damages.0 3  The United States
can sue for injunction and other equitable relief'0 4 and can seek criminal
penalties' 65 under the same acts. Finally, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion can issue cease and desist orders' 68 which, when final, 07 are
enforceable by fines of up to $10,000 per day and equitable relief.108 In
addition to the remedies available against bar associations as entities,
157. See notes 78-153 supra and accompanying text.
158. In re American Medical Ass'n, No. 9064 (FTC, filed Dec. 22, 1975), discussed
in BNA ANTrTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 744, at AA-1 (Dec. 23, 1975).
159. Section 202(a) of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a) (Supp. IV, 1974), granted the FTC power to issue
trade regulation rules; one court had previously determined that the Commission had
implicit rulemaking authority. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d
672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
160. The Act does not specifically grant power to preempt state legislation. See 15
U.S.C. § 57a(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). The asserted power is questionable in light of the
Parker rule of nonpreemption. See note 254 infra.
161. See BNA ANrarusT & TRADE REo. REP. No. 716, at A-2 (June 3, 1975).
162. See id. No. 745, at A-6 (Jan. 6, 1976).
163. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), allows recovery of treble
damages for "anything forbidden in the antitrust laws," and § 16 of the Act, id. § 26,
allows such persons equitable relief, but § 1 of the Clayton Act, id. § 12, limits "anti-
trust laws" so that violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act are excluded. E.g.,
Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carlson v. Coca-Cola
Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973); see Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S.
373, 375-76 (1958).
164. 15 U.S.C. H9 4, 25 (1970); see United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp.
507 (D. Ore. 1974).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 15 U.S.C. H§ 1, 2 (1970); 15
U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
167. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1970).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (1970).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/4
Vol. 1975:1011] ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 1043
association members who ratify antitrust violations may become indi-
vidually liable.1 9
C. Jurisdiction of the Antitrust Laws Over Restrictions on Prepaid
Legal Services
1. The Sherman Act
The Sherman Act takes effect only when "trade or commerce among
the several states or with foreign nations" 17 can be shown. This
language mirrors that of the commerce clause, 71 and is generally inter-
preted as incorporating all the power granted by that clause." 2 Juris-
diction under the Sherman Act thus extends to all activities that "sub-
stantially affect" interstate commerce. 178
The Goldfarb Court rejected the argument that a title search is wholly
intrastate and therefore outside the reach of the Sherman Act.'17  The
169. See generally Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), noted in 1975 UTAH L. REv. 292.
170. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970). Section 3 is based on congressional power to legislate
for the District of Columbia and the territories, and thus does not require a showing of
interstate commerce. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519
(1943).
171. "[The Congress shall have power] to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states .... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(8).
172. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) ("Congress
intended to strike as broadly as it could in § I of the Sherman Act"); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95, 201-02 (1975); United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 550-54 (1944) ("Language more comprehensive
is difficult to conceive"). The commerce requirement of the Sherman Act is dis-
cussed in Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 DUKE LJ. 236; Note,
Portrait of the Sherman Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 323
(1974).
173. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 278
(1975); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234
(1948); see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783-85 (1975); United States
v. Employing Plasterer's Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954); United States v. Women's
Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1949); Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193
U.S. 38, 44-46 (1904).
174. The County Bar argued that it was protected by the decision in United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), which had found a conspiracy to control taxi
transporation of passengers to and from Chicago railroad stations (and all other taxi
service in Chicago) to be "too unrelated" to interstate commerce. Id. at 230. The
Court found that the "relationship to interstate transit is only casual and incidental." Id.
at 231. The Goldfarb Court distinguished Yellow Cab, saying "[h]ere ...the legal
services are coincidental with interstate real estate transactions in terms of time, and
more important, in terms of continuity they are essential." 421 U.S. at 784 n.13. As-
suming that the Sherman Act uses all of the commerce power, see note 172 supra, the
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Court first relied on "the substantial volume of commerce involved.'17
"A significant portion" of purchase money loans for Virginia real estate
came from outside the state, and "significant amounts" of loans were
guaranteed by federal agencies in the District of Columbia.' 70  Second,
the Court relied on "the inseparability of this particular legal service
from the interstate aspects of real estate transactions.' No one would
lend money secured by real property without some assurance that valid
title to the property would be obtained; a title search is essential "in a
practical sense" to the interstate loan transaction.17  Even if the title
search were wholly intrastate, it substantially affected interstate com-
merce, and was thus within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. 17
The test stated by the Goldfarb Court is:
Where, as a matter of law or practical necessity, legal services are
an integral part of an interstate transaction, a restraint on those services
may substantially affect commerce for Sherman Act purposes.' 80
The Court warned that some legal services may meet the commerce
requirement of the Sherman Act in other ways, but indicated that some
activities of a lawyer may be purely intrastate.' 8'
continuing validity of Yellow Cab is questionable after more recent interpretations of
the breadth of the commerce clause. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964). But cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 198,
202 (1974); Diversified Brokerage Servs., Inc. v. The Greater Des Moines Bd. of
Realtors, 521 F.2d 1343, 1346 (8th Cir. 1975) ("the mere movement of individuals from
one state to another in order to utilize particular services does not transform those
services into interstate services within the meaning of the Sherman Act").
175. 421 U.S. at 785.
176. Id. at 783. The district court found that about 44 percent of all mortgages
under $100,000 were located outside of Virginia. The court also found that in 1971
Fairfax County received about $50,000,000 in home loans guaranteed by the Veterans
Administration and $25,000,000 in home mortgages insured by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491,
497 (E.D. Va. 1973).
177. 421 U.S. at 785.
178. Id. at 784.
179. Id. at 785. See Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 234 (1948).
The source of the restraint may be intrastate . . . the application of the re-
straint may be intrastate . . . but neither matters if the necessary effect is to
stifle or restrain commerce among the states. If it is interstate commerce that
feels that pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the
squeeze.
United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949). But cf.
note 174 supra.
180. 421 U.S. at 785.
181. inhere may be legal services that involve interstate commerce in other
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Applied to prepaid legal services, the Goldfarb test is satisfied if the
services are "an integral part of an interstate transaction."' 82 The
"integral part" requirement would be met if, as a practical matter, the
transaction would not occur should the legal services not be per-
formed. '8 The interstate element would be met if some, but not al, of
the transactions were interstate.8 4 Many services provided by prepaid
legal service plans would meet this test. For example, one plan includes
"real estate matters," which Goldfarb shows meet the interstate com-
merce requirement; "debt collection," which could involve levy on and
sale of property in another state; "bankruptcy," "trusteeship," and "pro-
bate," which could involve liquidation of property through sale in inter-
state commerce or continuing the operation of a business engaged in
interstate commerce; federal tax matters; and "other civil matters," which
could include defense to collection of a debt by an out-of-state plain-
tiff.188 In addition, the plan itself would meet the Goldfarb standard if
offered in more than one state,' 8 6 and its financing could also meet the
standard under the reasoning used by the Court.L8 7 In short, though it
may be possible to devise a prepaid legal service plan that does not meet
the Goldfarb interstate commerce standard such a plan would be ex-
tremely limited and almost certainly commercially infeasible.188
fashions, just as there may be legal services that have no nexus with interstate
commerce and thus are beyond the reach of the Sherman Act.
Id.
182. Id. Given a large enough membership, substantial effect would not be difficult
to show; but the effect on commerce must be demonstrated by evidence. Mere
allegations are insufficient. See Diversified Brokerage Servs., Inc. v. The Greater Des
Moines Bd. of Realtors, 521 F.2d 1343 (8th Cir. 1975); Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, Civil No. 1763-73 (D.N.J., Aug. 20, 1975).
183. See note 180 supra and accompanying text.
184. See note 176 supra and accompanying text.
185. Franklin County Police and Firefighters Program of Columbus, Ohio, described
in C. LILLY, supra note 99, at 82-83. For details of other plans, see id. at 66-185.
186. Cf. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944);
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
187. See note 176 supra and accompanying text.
188. See PREPAre LEGAL SERVICES 152-53 (statement of L. Bernstein). The Employ-
ee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 includes prepaid legal services in plans
regulated by the Act under the commerce clause. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a),
1002(1) (A), 1003(a) (Supp. IV, 1974), discussed in notes 268-77 infra and accompany-
ing text. Cf. ABA COMM. ON PtOFESSioNAL ETacs, OPINIONs, No. 316 (1967):
Much of clients' business crosses state lines. People are mobile, moving from
state to state. Many metropolitan areas cross state lines. It is common today
to have a single economic and social community involving more than one state.
The business of one client may involve legal problems in several states.
Quoted in Canon 3, n.8 ABA CODE.
1045
Washington University Open Scholarship
1046 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:1011
The Sherman Act also requires the activity restrained or monopolized
to be "trade or commerce."18'  The Goldfarb Court rejected the argu-
ment that since the practice of law is a "learned profession," it is not
"trade or commerce," and thus not subject to the Sherman Act.1 10
Citing the "heavy presumption against implicit exemptions,"'' 1 the
Court held that "[w]hatever else it may be, the examination of a land
title is a service," and sale of services is covered by the Sherman Act.092
The Court flatly stated that "the nature of an occupation, standing
alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act."'193
Although Goldfarb conclusively rejected the blanket "learned profes-
sion" exemption, a related argument remains open:
The public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may re-
quire that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differ-
ently.' 94
189. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970).
190. 421 U.S. at 785-88. The "learned profession" exemption had support in past
dicta, see id. at 786 n.15 (cases collected), and had been tentatively suggested by some
commentators. See, e.g., Coleman, The Learned Professions, 33 ABA ANTiTRUST L.J.
48 (1967). One state court in a well-reasoned opinion adopted the exemption in
interpreting its little Sherman Act on the theory that abuse of minimum fee schedules
should be regulated as unprofessional conduct, not as an antitrust violation. Lincoln
Rochester Trust Co. v. Freeman, 34 N.Y.2d 1, 311 N.E.2d 480, 355 N.Y.S.2d 336
(1974). Following the Fourth Circuit's adoption of the exemption in the Goldlarb case,
497 F.2d 1, 13-15 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), several federal decisions
applied the exemption, dismissing actions under § 1 of the Sherman Act against
professional associations. E.g., Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975);
Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. v. National Council of Architectural Registration Bds., Civil
No. 74-896 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 13, 1975).
191. 421 U.S. at 787. See generally Pogue, The Rationale of Exemptions from
Antitrust, 19 ABA ANTrrRuST SECTION 313, 327-28 (1961).
192. 421 U.S. at 787, citing American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519
(1943); see notes 195-97 infra and accompanying text.
193. 421 U.S. at 787.
In the modem world it cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an
important part in commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by
lawyers may exert a restraint on commerce.
Id. at 788.
194. Id. at 788 n.17; cf. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100,
421 U.S. 616 (1975):
[A] proper accommodation between the congressional policy favoring col-
lective bargaining under the NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free
competition in business markets requires that some union-employer agreements
be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions. ...
... Union success in organizing workers and standardizing wages ultimately
will affect price competition among employers, but the goals of federal labor
law never could be achieved if this effect on business competition were held
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/4
Vol. 1975:1011] ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
But this analysis is unlikely to prevent application of the Sherman Act to
prepaid legal services. In American Medical Association v. United
States,'95 a closely analogous case dealing with prepaid medical serv-
ices, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the activities
of doctors fell within the Sherman Act. 90 Instead, the Court avoided
the "learned profession" issue and held that the corporation adminis-
tering the plan was engaged in a "business or trade" subject to the
Act.197
2. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act only applies if both the acquiring and
the acquired corporation'9 8 are "engaged in commerce."' 199 Although
the Act defines "commerce" in the language of the commerce
clause, °00 the Supreme Court held in United States v. American Build-
ing Maintenance Industries:20'
the phrase "engaged in commerce" . . . means engaged in the flow
of interstate commerce, and was not intended to reach all corporations
engaged in activities subject to the federal commerce power.202
a violation of the antitrust laws. The Court therefore has acknowledged that
labor policy requires tolerance for the lessening of business competition based
on differences in wages and working conditions.
Id. at 622, citing Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewell Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). See
notes 86-96 supra and accompanying text.
195. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
196. Id. at 528.
197. Group Health is a membership corporation engaged in business or trade.
Its corporate activity is the consummation of the co-operative effort of its mem-
bers to obtain for themselves and their families medical service and hospitaliza-
tion on a risk-sharing prepayment basis. The corporation collects its funds
from members. With those funds, physicians are employed and hospitalization
procured on behalf of members and their dependents. The fact that it is
co-operative, and procures service and facilities on behalf of its members only,
does not remove its activities from the sphere of business.
Id. (footnote omitted).
198. See notes 207-13 infra and accompanying text (discussion of the "corporation"
requirement).
199. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
200. Compare the Clayton Act: "'Commerce,' as used herein, means trade or
commerce among the several states and with foreign nations .... " id. § 12, with U.S.
CONsT. art. 1, § 8(8), quoted in note 171 supra.
201. 422 U.S. 271 (1975).
202. Id. at 283. The Court held that a corporation providing local janitorial services
was not "engaged in commerce." See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186,
202 (1974); cf. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941) (adopting a similar
construction of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
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The Court stated that "simply supplying localized services to a corpora-
tion engaged in interstate commerce does not satisfy the 'in commerce'
requirement of § 7 .'203 The Clayton Act can therefore be applied to a
corporation providing legal services only upon a demonstration that the
services themselves are "in commerce" 20 4 or a showing that the organiza-
tion providing legal services is "in commerce" 2 0°-a far more difficult
requirement than the showing of "substantial effect" required for the
Sherman Act. Probably neither the Goldfarb title search nor the ser-
vices provided by a lawyer under a prepaid legal services plan200 would
be found to be "in commerce." Nevertheless, the commerce require-
ment may be met if the plan itself operates interstate.
In addition, section 7 of the Clayton Act applies only to corpora-
tions. 20 7 The standard partnership law practice therefore would not be
covered.08 Prepaid legal service plans may be set up in corporate
form, however, so the Act may apply to them. There are two problem
areas. First, no cases have been found applying the Clayton Act to
nonprofit corporations. Although it is, in theory, possible to apply the
Act 09--certainly a nonprofit corporation could "substantially lessen
competition"21° -there seems to be no precedent for holding the Act
applicable to prepaid legal services in nonprofit corporate form. Sec-
ond, the most common kind of profitmaking corporations providing
legal services will be insurance companies211 insulated by the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act212 from antitrust liability. Nevertheless, a profit cor-
poration providing prepaid services not regulated by state insurance law
would fall within the Act.213
203. 422 U.S. at 283.
204. Cf. ABA OPINION, supra note 188.
205. Cf. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943)
(finding a restraint of the "business of group health"), quoted in note 197 supra
and accompanying text.
206. See note 185 supra and accompanying text.
207. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
208. See United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 278-79
(1975).
209. Cf. Nawalanic, Motives of Non-Profit Organizations and the Antitrust Laws, 21
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 97 (1972).
210. For a discussion of "substantially lessen competition," see Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 297-314 (1949).
211. Under the Chicago Amendments, insurance companies may be the only profit
corporations that can sponsor closed panel prepaid legal plans. See note 36 supra and
accompanying text.
212. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1970).
213. Mhe Sherman Act... the Clayton Act, and .. the Federal Trade
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Finally, to violate the Clayton Act a merger must tend to decrease
competition "in any line of commerce. ' 214  A "line of commerce"' is a
"product market" in which competition may be affected.2 15  Given the
"heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the antitrust
laws' 1 and the provision in the McCarran Act that the Clayton Act
applies to unregulated insurance,217 there is little doubt prepaid legal
services constitute a "line of commerce."
3. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
The 1974 amendments to section 5 of the FTCA broadened its
jurisdictional language from "unfair methods of competition in com-
merce"218 to "unfair methods . . . in or affecting commerce."2 19  The
change was intended to overcome a restrictive jurisdictional reading by
the Supreme Court, 2 0 and apparently makes the FTCA co-extensive
with the commerce clause.221  Thus, the FTC's jurisdiction is at least
as broad as that of the Sherman Act. 22 2 Since the FTC has jurisdiction
over "persons, partnerships, or corporations," 223 it may regulate prepaid
legal services regardless of their organizational form.
4. Summary
Both the Sherman Act and FTCA apply to bar association restraints
on prepaid legal services since prepaid legal services can substantially
Commission Act . . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the
extent that such business is not regulated by State law.
Id. § 1012(b).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
215. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
216. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) citing Unit-
ed States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (applying the Clayton Act to
a service industry-banking).
217. Quoted in note 213 supra.
218. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. IV. 1974) (emphasis
added).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970) (emphasis
added).
220. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
221. The House Report states:
[The amendment] will reflect both the structure of the modern American
economy and the current Constitutional concept of the proper scope of the
Federal Government's authority to regulate the economy.
H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
222. See notes 170-88 supra and accompanying text.
223. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
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affect interstate commerce. The Clayton Act probably does not apply
because it requires providers of prepaid legal services to be engaged
directly in interstate commerce. The Clayton Act could apply, how-
ever, to a corporation providing prepaid legal services if that corporation
operated interstate.
D. Bar Association Imunity From Antitrust Liability
Under the old Canons of Ethics,224 bar association ethics committees
issued opinions interpreting the vague language of the Canons. The
opinions were given great weight in disciplinary proceedings.2   Al-
though the Canons have been replaced by the specific Disciplinary Rules
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the power to issue ethical
opinions, and presumably their weight in the courts, continues. 220  The
Goldfarb Court viewed the ethical opinions of the state bar associa-
tion227 as damaging evidence of private228 enforcement of the fee sched-
ule by the bar association defendants:2 29
224. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmIcs, reprinted in V. COUNTRYMAN & T."
FINMAN, supra note 3, at 885-97.
225. The Canons were interpreted by Formal and Informal Opinions of the ABA
Committee on Professional Ethics in answer to questions proposed to it. The ABA
interpretations were not binding on the courts, but were very influential in guiding state
disciplinary proceedings. See Hunter v. Troupe, 315 Ill. 293, 302, 146 N.E. 321, 324
(1924):
The American Bar Association is not a legislative tribunal, and its canons of
ethics are not of binding obligation and are not enforced as such by the courts,
although they constitute a safe guide for professional conduct in the cases to
which they apply, and an attorney may be disciplined by this court for not ob-
serving them.
226. See Armstrong, Ethical Problems in Connection With The Delivery of Legal
Services, 12 SAN Dmco L. Rnv. 336, 345-55 (1975).
227. One opinion stated that "'evidence that an attorney habitually charges less than
the suggested minimum fee schedule . . . raises a presumption that such lawyer is guilty
of misconduct .... "' Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 777-78 (1975)
(emphasis original), quoting VIRGINI, STATE BAR CoMMTrTrn ON LEGAL ETHICS, Opin-
ion No. 170, May 28, 1971. See also 421 U.S. at 777 n.5, 782-83.
228. 421 U.S. at 791-92 (footnote omitted):
The State Bar, by providing that deviation from County Bar minimum fees
may lead to disciplinary action, has voluntarily joined m what is essentially
a private anticompetitive activity, and in that posture cannot claim it is beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act.
229. In Goldfarb, the County Bar Association insisted that its fee schedule merely
suggested fees and that since the schedule was not mandatory it did not constitute price
fixing. The Court disagreed, stating that "[ihe fee schedule was enforced through the
prospect of professional discipline from the State Bar, and the desire of attorneys to
comply with announced professional norms . . . ." 421 U.S. at 781. Although the fee
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[T]he State Bar's ethical opinions provided substantial reason for law-
yers to comply with the minimum fee schedules. Those opinions threat-
ened professional discipline for habitual disregard of fee schedules, and
thus attorneys knew their livelihood was in jeopardy if they did so.
Even without that threat the opinions would have constituted substantial
reason to adhere to the schedules because attorneys could be expected
to comply in order to assure that they did not discredit themselves by
departing from professional norms, and perhaps betraying their profes-
sional oaths. 230
Thus, if bar associations attempt to prevent development of prepaid
legal services through restrictive ethical opinions, they are likely to build
an antitrust plaintiffs case for him.23'
The Code of Professional Responsibility, however, stands in a differ-
ent position. The Code is enacted by the state by statute or rule of
court, and disciplinary action can only result from violation of the
specific Disciplinary Rules. Although the Disciplinary Rules may con-
stitute a restraint of trade that would be illegal under the antitrust laws if
privately enforced, the restraint can be viewed as the product of enact-
ment of the Code by the state rather than adoption of the Code by the
bar association. Enactment of the Code by the state may give antitrust
immunity to bar associations under three theories-the state action
exemption, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and the eleventh amend-
ment.
schedule had never been enforced in formal disciplinary proceedings, id. at 776-77, the
Court did not consider this fact to be relevant.
230. 421 U.S. at 791 n.21.
231. The validity of an ethical opinion under the antitrust laws may depend upon how
closely the opinion follows the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. The ethical opinion
quoted in Goldfarb, see note 227 supra, was without support in the Code. The
Disciplinary Rules of the Code did not mention minimum fees; they provided only that
"The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services" was one factor in
determining whether a fee was "clearly excessive." DR 2-106(B)(3), 211 Va. 295, 313
(1970) (emphasis added).
The antitrust effect of ethical opinions clarifying ambiguities in the Code may be
different. Some Disciplinary Rules are obviously anticompetitive but are undefined in
scope. See ABA Code DR 2-103(D)(5), quoted in note 20 supra. Ethical opinions
interpreting such rules would perform the useful function of defining activities that are
permitted, thus lessening the anticompetitive effect. Such opinions should be sustained.
On the other hand, opinions defining an ambiguous but not inherently anticompetitive
rule in an anticompetitive fashion should be treated in the same manner as restrictions
unsupported by the Code, since the restraint flows from the opinion, not the Code. See
DR 2-103(D)(4)(e), Chicago Amendments, quoted in note 43 supra, and notes 39-42
supra and accompanying text.
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1. The State Action Exemption
The plaintiff in Parker v. Brown8 2 alleged that an agricultural pro-
duction and price stabilization program instituted by raisin growers
pusuant to a California statute2 33 would prevent him from marketing his
crop; he argued that the program violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. The Court held that, assuming the activities shown
would violate the Sherman Act if undertaken by private parties, state
involvement took the program outside the reach of the antitrust laws.
[I]t is plain that the prorate program here was never intended to op-
erate by force of individual agreement or combination. It derived its
authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state and
was not intended to operate or become effective without that command.
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history
which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or
agents from activities directed by its legislature.
The state. . . as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of govern-
ment which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit. 23 4
The Court in Parker, relying on legislative intent,2"' decided that the
Sherman Act does not preempt anticompetitive state action. 28 6 Yet the
232. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
233. Cal. Agric. Prorate Act, Law of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, [1933] Cal. Stats. (now
Agric. Producers Mkting. Law, CAL. Acauc. CODE §§ 59501-60015 (Deering, 1967)).
The statute operated as follows: the Governor appointed a commission, the members
approved by the senate; the Director of Agriculture was an ex officio member. If ten
producers petitioned the Commission for an agricultural production and price stabiliza-
tion program to be established, and a public hearing were held, the commission would
grant the petition
after making prescribed economic findings . showing that ... a program
... will prevent agricultural waste and conserve agricultural wealth of the
state without permitting unreasonable profits to producers ....
317 U.S. at 346. Then a program committee made up of producers would form a plan.
After another public hearing and a finding that the plan was "reasonably calculated to
carry out the objectives of the Act," the commission would approve, or modify and
approve, the plan. Finally, after approval by 65 percent of the producers and owners of
51 percent of the acreage, the Director would declare the plan instituted. Violation of
the plan was a misdemeanor. Id. at 346-47.
234. 317 U.S. at 350-51, 352 (citations omitted).
235. The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint
that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a
state. ...
There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the Act's legis-
lative history.
Id. at 351. See text at note 234 supra.
236. See 317 U.S. at 344, 350, 352.
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Court stated that state action will not immunize private conduct from
antitrust liability.
[A] state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act
by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is law-
ful. . . and we have no question of the state or its municipality becom-
ing a participant in a private agreement or combination by others for
restraint of trade .... 237
A tension exists in the Parker dichotomy between unprotected private
action and protected state action, since the Parker Court did not specify
the amount of state involvement necessary to protect anticompetitive
conduct from antitrust liability.23 8 The Supreme Court made no at-
237. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted); accord, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,
389 (1951).
238. The dichotomy has been variously stated: "ITMhe Act was intended to regulate
private practices and not to prohibit a State from imposing a restraint as an act of
government." Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975). "Where a
restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid government action, as
opposed to private action, no violation of the Act can be made out." Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961) (footnote
omitted).
The controversy centers on the amount of state regulation necessary to trigger the
Parker exemption. One view held that "any form of state presence" was enough. See
New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 510 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974) noted in 1974
UTAH L REV. 592, 596 and cases cited therein. Thus, if a state agency had jurisdiction
over the anticompetitive activity, antitrust immunity was conferred-even if the state had
not actively asserted its power. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 11 (4th
Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In Goldfarb, the Fourth Circuit stated
that there must be "active supervision by independent state officials" for Parker to apply,
id. (emphasis original), but concluded that:
mhe Virginia court's inaction with regard to specifically approving or disap-
proving the schedules in question should not be construed as a failure to ade-
quately supervise.. .. [O]ne should not equate silence with abandonment of
the duty to supervise. "It is just as sensible to infer that silence means consent,
i.e. approval." The Virginia court has the authority to regulate and supervise
the State Bar; we will not infer abandonment of that authority because of
claimed inactivity. The active independent state supervision required in Parker
is provided here by the Virginia court.
Id. (footnote omitted). Some support for the view that state presence alone suffices can
be drawn from the facts of Parker. The anticompetitive program was devised by
producers, and the commission that approved it was composed of producers (with the
exception of the ex officio Director of Agriculture). See note 233 supra. The state had
little to do with the actual restraint. Rigid application of the legislative intent rationale
for the Parker exemption, see note 235 supra, could support a conclusion that state
jurisdiction and federal antitrust jurisdiction are mutually exclusive. The Parker Court
stated:
In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states
are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their
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tempt to resolve this tension23 9 until the Goldfarb decision.
The defendants in Goldfarb argued that their activities were protected
state action under Parker. The state supreme court, empowered by
statute to promulgate ethical codes,2 40 adopted the Code of Professional
Responsibility,241 which referred to fee schedules as "guidance" in
authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers
and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.
317 U.S. at 351.
Commentators uniformly urged a narrow construction of the Parker rule. See, e.g.,
Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 ANnTRUST
L.J. 950, 957-67 (1970) (anticompetitive action questionable unless (1) valid local
reason to limit competition shown; (2) action mandated and limited by statute; (3) no
less restrictive alternative present); Simmons & Fornaciari, State Regulation as an Anti-
trust Defense. An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 61,
87-92 (1974) (state must mandate anticompetitive action; "immunity should hinge on
whether the private party has made the decision to engage in anticompetitive conduct");
Tepley, Antitrust Immunity of State and Local Governmental Action, 48 TUL. L. REV.
272, 298 (1974) (more than mere state presence needed; may not be inconsistent with
federal policy; may not approve private restraint or have conspiracy between public offi-
cial and private party; the action must be regulatory, with specific limit on discretionary
power); Note, State Action Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 50 B.U.L. REv. 393, 416
(1970) (mere presence of state is not enough; must weigh whether public or private ac-
tion; regulation must be in good faith); Note, Parker v. Brown-Gone to Hecht: A New
Test for State Action Exemptions, 24 HAStNGS LJ. 287, 295 (1973) (should use the
six point federal action test of Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.
1971), for state action); Comment, Whitten v. Paddock: The Sherman Act and the
"Government Action" Immunity Reconsidered, 71 COLum. L REV. 140, 156 (1971)
(under "solid policy guidelines" would limit Parker to "deliberately regulatory activity");
26 Muncan L. REV. 995, 1001 (1975); Comment, Antitrust Immunity-Reevaluation
and Synthesis of Parker v. Brown-Intent, State Action, Causation, 19 WAYNE L. RaV.
1245, 1263 (1973) (three factors of immune state action: (1) intent to supplant compe-
tition; (2) valid state action; (3) not "tainted through intervention of private decision-
making"). The state presence test has now been conclusively rejected by the Supreme
Court. See note 250 infra and accompanying text.
239. The Court did cryptically refer to the Parker state action antitrust exemption
four times. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
706 (1962) (Parker "sustained the validity of mandatory state . . . governmental
regulations"); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
135-36 (1961) ("valid governmental action, as opposed to private action"); Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 389 (1951) (state may not "demand
private conduct which the Sherman Act forbids"); United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 562 (1944):
the argument that the Sherman Act necessarily invalidates many state laws reg-
ulating insurance we regard as exaggerated. Few states go so far as to permit
private insurance companies, without state supervision, to agree upon and fix
uniform insurance rates.
Cf. Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247, 253 n.4 (1947) (since rules of the Board of
Trade were not enforced by civil or criminal penalties, "[w]e . . . have no attempt here
to endow private groups with law-making functions").
240. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-48(b) (1974 repl. vol.).
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setting fees. 242  The state bar, integrated 243 by order of the state su-
preme court24 4 as authorized by statute, 245 was "a state agency by
law.1246  The state bar asserted "that in issuing fee schedules . . .it
was merely implementing the fee provisions of the ethical code." 247 The
county bar could not claim to be a "state agency," but said "the activities
of the State Bar 'prompted' it to issue fee schedules and thus its actions,
too, are state action. 248
In the process of holding that neither defendant was entitled to Parker
immunity, the Supreme Court clarified the state action exemption
through a "threshold inquiry"-"whether the activity is required by the
State acting as sovereign.1 249  The Court stressed that "anticompetitive
activities must be compelled by direction of the State acting as a
sovereign.112:,' Further analysis was unnecessary:
242. See EC 2-18, 211 Va. 295, 302 (1970). The provision was eliminated after the
Goldfarb litigation commenced. See EC 2-18, Houston Amendments.
243. Membership in the state bar association is a prerequisite for the practice of law
in states with integrated bars. See Glaser, The Organization of the Integrated Bar
(1960), in V. COUNTRYMAN & T. FINMAN, supra note 3, at 348. Integration does not
infringe the first amendment rights of attorneys, see Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820
(1961), and permits a centralized disciplinary structure, thought necessary for effective
regulation of the bar. See Emslie v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 2d 210, 225, 520 P.2d 991, 999,
113 Cal. Rptr. 175, 183(1974); ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 5-6,
24-29 (1970) (the Clark Committee Report).
244. 171 Va. xlvii (1938).
245. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (1974 repl. vol.).
246. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975). The statute specifi-
cally authorized the State Bar "to act as an administrative agency of the Court for the
purpose of investigating and reporting the violation of such rules and regulations as are
adopted by the Court." VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (1974 repl. vol.).
247. 421 U.S. at 790.
248. Id.
249. Id. (emphasis added). The Court cited Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide
& Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07 (1962), a case rejecting a claim of antitrust
immunity under the act of state doctrine. See note 254 infra.
250. 421 U.S. at 791 (emphasis added). The Court stated:
Here we need not inquire further into the state-action question because it can-
not fairly be said that the State of Virginia through its Supreme Court Rules
required the anticompetitive activities of either respondent. Respondents have
pointed to no Virginia statute requiring their activities; state law simply does
not refer to fees, leaving the regulation of the profession to the Virginia Su-
preme Court; although the Supreme Court's ethical codes mention advisory fee
schedules they do not direct either respondent to supply them, or require the
type of price floor which arose from respondents' activities. Although the
State Bar apparently has been granted the power to issue ethical opinions there
is no indication in this record that the Virginia Supreme Court approves the
opinions. Respondents' arguments, at most, constitute the contention that their
activities complemented the objective of the ethical code. In our view that is
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[l]t cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia through its Supreme
Court Rules required the anticompetitive activities of either respondent.
The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes
does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive
practices for the benefit of its members.251
not state action for the Sherman Act purposes. It is not enough that, as the
County Bar puts it, anticompetitive conduct is "prompted" by state action;
rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction of the State
acting as a sovereign.
Id. at 791-92 (emphasis added). The Court implicitly rejected the state presence test.
See note 238 supra.
The compulsion test can be drawn from language in Parker.
The state [creates] the machinery for establishing the prorate program ...
[And the] state, acting through the Commission . . . adopts the program and
enforces it with penal sanctions, in the execution of a governmental policy.
• . . The state itself exercises its legislative authority in making the regulation
and in prescribing the conditions of its application.
The state. . . as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of govern-
ment which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit.
317 U.S. at 351-52. Nevertheless, the state in Parker, though actively involved, fell
short of compelling the specific anticompetitive program; it rather permitted the program
to be instituted and provided procedural safeguards and enforcement. The program went
through two public hearings before being instituted; the commission, which was ap-
pointed by the Governor and approved by the senate had discretion to reject or modify
the plan; the commission had to make specific findings regarding the plan's economic
impact and whether the plan met the Act's objectives; violation was punishable by fine
or imprisonment. See note 233 supra.
Since Parker remains good law, it therefore seems that the state/private action tension
will continue-though the area of controversy is restricted to the differences between the
Parker facts, supra, and the Goldfarb facts. See notes 240-48, 250 supra and accom-
panying text.
251. 421 U.S. at 790-91 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Court cited
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973). In the Gibson case, licensed
optometrists, not members of the Alabama Optometric Association, were charged by the
Association with unprofessional conduct for being employed by corporations. The
charge was brought before the state board of optometry which was composed entirely of
Association members. The action was challenged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) on the
ground that the board's pecuniary bias constituted a denial of due process. The district
court found an unconstitutional bias, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Gibson v. Berry-
hill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973). The Goldfarb citation of Gibson suggests that:
Valid state action or regulation of an industry may include participation even
by interested private parties, but such parties must not be those who ultimately
decide whether the policies of the federal antitrust laws are to be subordinated
to other interests, and particularly to their own direct pecuniary interests.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 22, United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore.
1974) (citing Gibson). Alternatively, constitutional challenge of Parker state action is
suggested. See note 303 infra and accompanying text.
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Since the State Bar "voluntarily joined in what is essentially a private
anticompetitive activity" by issuing ethical opinions threatening discipli-
nary action if the County Bar's minimum fees were not followed, it
could not claim Parker immunity.252
By the threshold analysis, if the anticompetitive action is not
"compelled' by statute or court rule, Parker does not apply.2"3 Since it
is only a threshold analysis, Parker might not apply even if the action
is compelled-but the Goldfarb opinion provides no further concrete
guidelines. 2 "
252. 421 U.S. at 792. See text at note 230 supra. See also Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943).
253. The Goldfarb opinion suggests the activities could have been compelled by
being: (I) required by statute; (2) directed by court rule; (3) a means of reaching an
anticompetitive end required by court rule; (4) required by ethical opinion approved by
the supreme court. See 421 U.S. at 790-91. Lower courts have not been consistent in
applying the Goldfarb standard. Compare Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1288
(3d Cir. 1975) and Chastain v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 401 F. Supp. 151, 159
(D.D.C. 1975) (strict standard), with Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1133
(5th Cir. 1975) (weaker standard).
254. One possibility is that anticompetitve activity will escape antitrust liability only
if, to find liability, the court must hold invalid a formal, binding declaration of state law.
In this view the Parker rule is not one of exemption but rather nonpreemption. There is
some support for this theory in the Goldfarb opinion; the Court refers to the "so-called
state-action exemption," 421 U.S. at 788 (emphasis added), and both Goldfarb and
Parker cite Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1904), for the underlying theory. 421
U.S. at 788; 317 U.S. at 352. In Olsen, the petitioner had violated a state licensing
statute; when sued, he defended by asserting that "the statutes . . . contain provisions
. . . repugnant . . . to the laws of Congress forbidding combinations in restraint of
trade or commerce." 195 U.S. at 339. The Court concluded that:
if the State has the power to regulate. . . those who are to perform pilotage
services, it must follow that no monopoly or combination in a legal sense can
arise from the fact that the duly authorized agents of the State are alone al-
lowed to perform the duties devolving upon them by law.. . . [TMhe remedy
is in Congress, in whom the ultimate authority on the subject is vested, and
cannot be judicially afforded by denying the power of the State to exercise its
authority over a subject concerning which it has plenary power until Congress
has seen fit to act in the premises.
Id. at 345. Parker itself was phrased in terms of preemption. See 317 U.S. at 344, 350.
An excellent analysis of the scope of the Parker rule may be found in Posner, The
Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49
N.Y.U.L. REv. 693 (1974). Analogy to four related areas of antitrust law may be
helpful.
(1) The "act of state" doctrine. Actions compelled by a foreign government are
excluded from antitrust liability. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 702-08 (1962), cited in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 790 (1975); 3 DENvER J. INT. L. & POL. 133 (1973).
(2) The limited application of antitrust law to federally regulated monopolies. One
case in particular is often cited for the same antitrust rule as Parker.
If the [Agricultural Marketing Agreement] Act and Order [of the Secretary of
1057
Washington University Open Scholarship
1058 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:10I
The Court emphasized that its opinion was not an attack on legiti-
mate state regulation of the practice of law.
We recognize that the States have a compelling interest in the prac-
tice of professions within their boundaries, and that . . . they have
broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regu-
lating the practice of professions. . . . The interest of the States in reg-
Agriculture] are otherwise valid, the fact that their effect would be to give
cooperatives a monopoly of the first market would not violate the Sherman
Act ....
United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 560 (1938).
The Parker rule can be viewed as simply "eliminat[ing] the preemption effect of the
federal antitrust laws on state legislation," and putting the state law on a "parity" with
federal legislation. Simmons & Fornaciari, supra note 238, at 71. The logical conclusion
is that the state action and federal regulation standards of immunity should be the same.
See Note, Parker v. Brown, Gone to Hecht: A New Test for State Action Exemptions,
supra note 238.
Antitrust violations can occur in federally regulated industries despite approval by the
regulators if sufficient weight is not given to competition in making the regulatory
decision. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United
States v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964). In addition, the
regulations may be "reconciled" with the antitrust laws, with anticompetitive regulation
permitted "only to the minimum extent necessary." Silver v. New York Stock Exch.,
373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). See generally Schwarzer, Regulated Industries and the
Antitrust Laws-An Overview, 41 I.C.C. PRAc. J. 543 (1974); Shenefield, Annual
Survey of Antitrust Developments-The Year of the Regulated Industry, 31 WAsH. &
LEE L. REv. 1 (1974); 47 TEMP. L.Q. 370 (1974).
(3) Limited application of antitrust law despite possession of a patent. Despite the
grant of monopoly rights to patent holders, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102-03, 154, 261 (1970),
see U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, a patent cannot be relied upon to immunize a restraint on
competition if the holder knows the patent to be invalid. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v.
Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). By analogy, the bar association
should not be able to rely on probably unconstitutional state action, see note 303 infra,
as a defense. See Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
438 F.2d 1286, 1295 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972). But cf. discus-
sion of Noerr-Pennington defense, notes 278-88 infra and accompanying text. See gener-
ally Stedman, Patents & Antitrust -The Impact of Varying Legal Doctrines, 1973 UTAH
L. REv. 588, 596-617; Symposium, 42 ABA ANrTRusT L.J. 631, 679-80 (1973).
(4) Limited application of the antitrust laws to insurance. The antitrust laws "shall
be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated
by state law . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970) (the McCarran-Ferguson Act). It
has been suggested that the McCarran Act and the Parker exemption are "coterminous."
See Simmons & Fornaciari, supra note 238, at 92-94. More accurately, the MeCarran
Act defines the outer limits of Parker immunity; the Parker rule must be narrower, since
it provided no immunity in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533
(1944), the case prompting passage of the McCarran Act. See id. at 562. See generally
Note, The Applicability of Antitrust Laws to the Insurance Industry, 22 DRAKE L. REV.
810 (1973).
An excellent discussion of the Parker rule may be found in Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 10-32,
United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/4
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ulating lawyers is especially great. . . In holding that certain anti-
competitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act
we intend no diminution of the authority of the State to regulate its pro-fessions.255
The Goldfarb threshold analysis is a convenient test of bar association
immunity from antitrust liability for restraints on prepaid legal services.
Acts of the ABA and local bar associations are not "compelled" by the
state; they are voluntary organizations, not state agencies. Thus, Parker
grants them no immunity. By the same reasoning, no acts of a state bar
association are protected unless the association is integrated by statute or
rule of court.2.16 Moreover, Goldfarb demonstrates that specific anti-
competitive actions of an integrated state bar will not be protected by
Parker if those actions are not ordered by statute or court. Thus,
promulgation of ethical opinions with anticompetitive effects is not
protected by Parker. 2 57
The restrictions contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility
require more analysis. Apparently it is not sufficient for the statute or
rule of court to adopt by reference "The ABA Code and all future
amendments," since that would delegate power to create anticompeti-
tive regulations to a private organization rather than "the State acting
as a sovereign. -58  Presumably, it would suffice for the state to adopt
an existing version of the Code, assuming its provisions were suffi-
ciently specific to compel the restriction for the Parker exemption to
apply.
The 1969 Code prohibited participation in prepaid legal services; ex-
ceptions were allowed "only. . .to the extent that controlling consti-
tutional interpretation . . . requires."2 9 This language is as close to an
absolute prohibition as the law would permit; since it is included in a
Disciplinary Rule, it is mandatory. Therefore, it may pass the Goldfarb
threshold. 60
The Disciplinary Rules of the Houston Amendments are specific and
prohibitive,2 11 and therefore pass the Goldfarb threshold. Anticompeti-
255. 421 U.S. at 792-93 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
256. See note 250 supra.
257. See 421 U.S. at 791 & n.21. See also notes 224-31 supra and accompanying
text.
258. 421 U.S. at 791. See ANTITRusT LAw DEVELOPMENTS 408-09.
259. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
260. If the provision were held unconstitutional, see note 303 infra, Parker would
probably not apply. Cf. patent discussion in note 254 supra; preemption discussion in
notes 267-77 infra and accompanying text.
261. See notes 24-30 supra and accompanying text.
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tive actions based on Ethical Consideration 2-3322 would not pass the
threshold, however, since Ethical Considerations are not mandatory. 203
The provision of the Chicago Amendments restricting closed panel
plans to nonprofit organizations 264 passes the Goldfarb threshold. But
the provision requiring a closed panel plan to pay outside counsel under
certain undefined circumstances25 does not require an anticompetitive
interpretation; 26 6 thus if a state bar association issued an opinion based
on this provision that a closed panel plan must provide a refund to a
member whenever he seeks outside counsel, the opinion would not pass
the threshold.
Restrictions that pass the Goldfarb threshold are subject to further
scrutiny,267 but would probably be granted antitrust immunity as state
action. The question is complicated, however, by federal preemption of
state laws regulating prepaid legal services.
Section 302(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 2 8 as amended in 1973,
makes prepaid legal service plans available as a fringe benefit through
collective bargaining. 26 9 The Pension Reform Act of 1974270 includes
Taft-Hartley legal service plans in the definition of "employee benefit
plan, ' 271 regulates them, 27 2 and states that:
the provisions of this subehapter. . . shall supercede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee bene-
fit plan .... 273
"'State law' includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State
action having the effect of law. .... ,,27 This broad definition would
include ethical codes adopted by statute or rule of court. Legislative
history indicates that the preemption extends to regulation of prepaid
262. See note 102 supra.
263. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
264. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
265. See DR-2-103 (D) (4) (e), quoted in note 43 supra and accompanying text.
266. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
267. See note 254 supra and accompanying text.
268. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1970), as
amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
269. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (8) (Supp. IV, 1974).
270. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381
(Supp. IV, 1974).
271. Id. § 1002(1), (3).
272. See id. §§ 1021-1144.
273. Id. § 1144(a) (§ 514 of the Pension Reform Act of 1974).
274. Id. § 1144(c)(1).
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legal services.27 5 Thus, the legislation preempts the Code of Profes-
uional Responsibility in regulating prepaid legal service plans "estab-
lished or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization,
or by both,' 276 but has no effect on Code regulation of other prepaid
legal service plans.
The Code has no effect when preempted; therefore any attempt to
enforce it through bar association disciplinary actions or ethical opinions
could not pass the Goldfarb threshold because the state could no longer
compel the restraint.277  If the bar chose to attack only plans not
covered by the federal legislation, Parker may still apply. But since the
bar's objections are now primarily centered on closed panel plans and
275. "All state laws would be preempted except for those covering plans not subject
to titles II and i." H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973). The debates
contain more direct evidence:
[Because of section 514,J State professional associations acting under the guise
of State-enforced professional regulation, should not be able to prevent unions
and employers from maintaining the types of employee benefit programs which
Congress has authorized-for example, prepaid legal services programs-
whether closed or open panel ....
120 CONG. REc. S15,742 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams); "Mhe
State, directly or indirectly through the bar, is preempted from regulating the form and
content of a legal service plan ... in the guise of disciplinary or ethical rules or
proceedings." 120 CONG. RFc. S15,758 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Sen.
Javits). Commentators frequently cite Sen. Javits to show legislative intent, see, e.g.,
Young, Group Legal Services and Canon 11, 34 MD. L. REv. 541, 559-60 n.83 (1974);
Note, Prepaid Legal Services, Ethical Codes, and the Snares of Antitrust, supra note 4,
at 756-57. The bar claims the remark was inserted in the record after the bill
passed and should be given no weight. See Comment, The Effect of ERISA on Pre-
paid Legal Services, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 566, 579-80 (1975). The point is at best periph-
eral; the language of § 514 is clear, see text at notes 273-74 supra, and debates are of
little value in deriving congressional intent, see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
385 (1968). The question is whether the state may prohibit lawyers from participating
in a plan specifically authorized by the Act. One court suggests this result:
the new Federal legal service statute may, perhaps, pre-empt the regulation of
union prepaid plans, qua plans, but does not reach the professional licensure
and regulation of lawyers, qua lawyers, who would render legal services under
the plans.
Feinstein v. Attorney Gen., 36 N.Y.2d 199, 205-06, 326 N.E.2d 288, 292, 366 N.Y.S.2d
613, 618 (1975) (dictum). Nevertheless, a professional regulation making it impossible
to establish such plans would accomplish indirectly what § 514 expressly forbids and
should be found to be within the intent of that section. Regulations that do not prohibit
participation but merely define generally applicable standards of professional conduct
would be allowed. The test should be whether the regulation has the effect of regulating
the plan instead of the attorney. See generally Bowers, ERISA and its Exceptions, 27
BAYLOR L. REV. 475 (1975); Comment, supra.
276. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
277. See note 250 supra and accompanying text.
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most such plans would be within the federal legislation, the Parker
exemption may have little practical value.
In summary, the Parker state action exemption does not protect the
ABA, local bar associations, or nonintegrated state bar associations.
Integrated state bar associations are not protected against antitrust
liability for restraints contained solely in ethical opinions or based on
Ethical Considerations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Anti-
competitive Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, if specific, are probably protected by Parker, but the practical utility
of the exemption has been greatly eroded by preemptive federal legis-
lation.
2. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight
Inc.,278 the Supreme Court held that collective action by railroads to
secure veto of legislation favorable to competing truckers did not violate
the Sherman Act, even if the veto created a trade restraint or monopoly.
The Court found nothing in the legislative history to indicate that the
Act applied to "political activity, 2 79 and recognized that application to
such activities would raise serious first amendment questions.280 United
Mine Workers v. Pennington28 involved a similar question. The union
was accused of conspiring with the owners of large mines to influence
the Secretary of Labor to take certain actions that would effectively
eliminate competition from small mines. The Court held that "Noerr
shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public
officials regardless of intent or purpose. 28 2 Bar associations may urge
that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine28 3 immunizes the organized bar
278. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
279. Id. at 137.
280. Id. at 138.
[-It would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that
groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use
the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advo-
cate their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their business and
economic interests vis-a-vis their competitors.
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972).
281. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
282. Id. at 670.
283. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508 (1972),
noted in 76 DIcK. L. REv. 593 (1972) and 26 Sw. L.J. 926 (1972); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 651 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). See generally Howe, The Noerr-Pennington
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/4
Vol. 1975:10111 ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 1063
from antitrust liability, arguing that in promulgating the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility the ABA drafted a model statute that it and other
bar associations then lobbied to secure enaction into law. If the Code
had no force or effect until it became law by statute or rule of court this
reasoning would be correct. The Noerr-Pennington defense should be
valid, however, only when the act of a public officer is necessary to
complete the anticompetitive action. 8 4 The Code, even when not
adopted, has a status similar to that of the old Canons. It is a
statement of policy carrying tremendous influence in the profession; it is
interpreted by ethical opinions intended to influence the actions of
attorneys; and it carries the implicit threat of professional censure.285
The Code is far more than a proposed uniform law; it has the immediate
effect of a trade organization's private ethical code. 8 6 Restraints in
trade organization codes of ethics have often been found to violate the
antitrust laws. 28 7  Thus, although the Noerr-Pennington doctrine pro-
tects bar associations lobbying for state adoption of the Code, it does not
protect bar associations that adopt the Code as a private standard and
attempt to enforce it.288
Doctrine and Inroads into it-Recent Supreme Court Decisions and Some Guidelines for
Trade Association Activity, 26 MERcER L. REv. 527 (1974); Oppenheim, Antitrust
Immunity for Joint Efforts to Influence Adjudication Before Administrative Agencies
and Courts-From Noerr-Pennington to Trucking Unlimited, 29 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
209 (1972).
284. Noerr-Pennington protects efforts to obtain anticompetitive state legislative,
administrative, or judicial action; private actions having anticompetitive effect without
any public action would be separable and therefore not protected. The doctrine is
related to the Parker state action exemption, see notes 232-67 supra and accompanying
text; Noerr protects efforts to obtain the results protected by Parker. Cf. Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 n.17 (1961). See
generally Oppenheim, supra note 283, at 224-31.
285. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 n.21 (1975), quoted in
text at note 230 supra.
286. The analogy to trade associations is developed in Hearings on the Organized
Bar, supra note 6, at 37 (remarks of Sen. Tunney), 100-08 (statement of M. Green).
287. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1945). See
generally Brebbia, Joint Legislative Activities and Codes of Ethics, 19 ANTrrrusT BULL.
681 (1974); Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition, and the Legality of
Trade Association Activities, 21 U. CHi. L. REv. 527 (1954).
288. Possible methods of private enforcement include promulgation of ethical opin-
ions to coerce anticompetitive activity, see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
791 n.21 (1975); issuance of formal unauthorized practice of law opinions and sending
them to "offenders," see Minutes of the Northeastern Regional Conference on Unautho-
rized Practice of Law, reported in 39 UNAUTHORZED PRAcr. Naws No. 1, at 8 (1974);
expulsion of "offenders" from local bar associations, with resulting loss of prestige and
trade, cf. Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care
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3. The Eleventh Amendment
The eleventh amendment states that "the judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another State .... -2"9 State bar associations assert that, as state
agencies, 290 this immunizes them from antitrust attack.2 1 The Gold-
farb Court did not reach the question.29 2
The eleventh amendment does not prohibit actions by the United
States293 to enforce the antitrust laws. 29 4  But it may prohibit suit by
any private party.295 There are two issues. First, it is not clear that a
state bar association is "one of the United States" for eleventh amend-
ment purposes. Although the state need not be a named party,200 not
Crisis, supra note 97, at 956-57; and local restrictions on advertising, cf. id. at
958. See also Rayack, Restrictive Practices of Organized Medicine, 13 ANIrmusT
BuLL. 659, 665-68 (1968).
In addition, if a lobbying effort
ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to
cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor... application of the Sherman Act
would be justified.
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)
(emphasis added). Similarly, intentional abuse of judicial or administrative proceedings
to harm a competitor will not be protected by Noerr. See California Motor Transp. Co.
v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 511-16, 518 (1972). Thus, "[c]onspiracy with a
licensing authority to eliminate a competitor may also result in an antitrust transgres-
sion." Id. at 513. See Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1975). See
generally Oppenheim, supra note 283, at 215-24.
289. U.S. CoNST. amend. XI. See generally Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974), noted in 88 HAIv. L. REv. 243 (1974); C. JACoBS, Tm ELEvENTRH AmNDMENT
AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNrTY (1972); Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
(A Case of the White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 Hous. L. Rav. 1 (1967); Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 H-Iv. L. Rnv. 1 (1963).
290. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 789-90 (1975).
291. Id. at 792 n.22.
292. Id.
293. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 669 (1974); see United States v. Texas, 143
U.S. 621, 641-46 (1892).
294. See United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974).
295. Although the amendment does not expressly prohibit suits against a state by
citizens of that state, such suits are excluded by judicial interpretations. See, e.g.,
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-21
(1890).
296. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department
of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 462-64 (1945)..
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all "state action" is protected by the amendment.297 The test is that
when monetary damages "will to a virtual certainty be paid from state
funds, and not from the pockets of the individual state officials who
were the defendants in the action"' 298 the eleventh amendment applies. A
state bar financed by individual dues may not be covered, since damages
would not have to be paid from the state's treasury.299
Second, if the state bar threatened enforcement of restraints that vio-
late federal constitutional300 or statutory law,30 1 the eleventh amend-
ment would prohibit only monetary damages. Injunctions, prospec-
tively applied, would be allowed. 02
Where the eleventh amendment applies, it gives greater protection
against monetary damages than does the Parker state action exemption;
the action contested, if lawful, may be totally discretionary-it need not
be compelled for immunity to result.
297. E.g.:
while county action is generally state action for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a county defendant is not necessarily a state defendant for pur-
poses of the Eleventh Amendment.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974). See generally Jaffe, supra note 289.
298. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974); see id. at 663; Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 563 (1945).
299. The issue becomes more complex when dues are required by statute or supreme
court rule.
300. The possible constitutional arguments relating to restrictions on prepaid legal
services are discussed in note 303 infra.
301. Federal statutory preemption is discussed in notes 168-76 supra and accompany-
ing text.
302. In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Court upheld an injunction issued
by a federal court that restrained the Attorney General of Minnesota from enforcing a
state statute alleged to be unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that since an unconstitu-
tional statute has no effect, any action to enforce it would be private action not protected
by the eleventh amendment. Id. at 155-60, 167-68.
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the
use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury
of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does
not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an
illegal act upon the part of a state official. . .. If the act which the Attorney
General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer
is . . .stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected
in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.
Id. at 159-60. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-68 (1974); Georgia R.R. &
Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 303-06 (1952). Since a state law preempted by
federal legislation is similarly void as violating the supremacy clause, U.S. CONsTr. art.
VI (2), action against the state officer is similarly permitted. "The State cannot ...
impart to the official immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the
United States." Ex parte Young, supra, at 167. See Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 868 (1824); cf. Edelman v. Jordan, supra at 654.
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4. A State/Private Action Dilemma
The common thread running through the Parker and Noerr-Penning-
ton doctrines and the eleventh amendment is that anticompetitive activi-
ties may be immune from antitrust liability if they are state action. But
if they are state action they are subject to constitutional challenge.8 °0
303. Four constitutional theories may apply. First, the Supreme Court has recognized
a right under the first amendment for groups to sponsor prepaid plans.
[We hold that the freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments gives petitioner the right to hire attor-
neys on a salary basis to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights.
UJMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967).
[T]he principle here involved cannot be limited to the facts of this case. At
issue is the basic right to group legal action. . . . The common thread run-
ning through our decisions. . . is that collective activity undertaken to obtain
meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection
of the First Amendment. . . . mhat right would be a hollow promise if
courts could deny associations of workers or others the means of enabling their
members to meet the costs of legal representation.
United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971) (emphasis added).
Accord, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 442 (1963). See generally Gilmore, The Organized
Bar and Prepaid Legal Services, 21 WAYNE L. Rnv. 213 (1975); Zimroth, Group Legal
Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.. 966 (1967); Comment, Group Legal
Services: From Houston to Chicago, 79 DIcK. L. REv. 621 (1975). Although the right
belongs to the group, not the attorney, consumer groups could challenge bar restrictions
on attorney participation in prepaid plans under a theory of unconstitutional overbreadth,
see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1967). The 1969 Code is also sus-
ceptible to attack on grounds of first and fourteenth amendment vagueness, see Smith
v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-76 (1974). Cf. Feinstein v. Attorney Gen., 36 N.Y.2d
199, 205, 326 N.E.2d 288, 291-92, 366 N.Y.S.2d 613, 618 (1975); In re Thom, 33
N.Y.2d 609, 613-15, 614 n.3, 301 N.E.2d 542, 544-47, 545 n.3, 347 N.Y.S.2d 571, 574-
77, 575 n.3 (1973). In addition, attorneys may have standing to assert the rights of con-
sumers. See Freeman & Bass, P.A. v. Commission of Invesigation, 359 F. Supp. 1053,
1059 (D.NJ.), rev'd on the merits, 486 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1973); cf. Pirillo v. Takiff,
- Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 896, 906 (1975). But the rule of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971), will probably prevent federal interference with an ongoing state disciplinary
proceeding. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Bozardt, No. 75-1335 (4th Cir., Mar.
8, 1976). The Supreme Court has stated that "the States have a compelling interest in
the practice of professions within their boundaries," Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 792 (1975); thus, regulation of the bar "to protect the public health, safety,
and other valid interests," id., would be constitutional if drawn with sufficiently narrow
specificity.
Second, consumers may challenge advertising restrictions by asserting a first amend-
ment "right to know" of essential services. See Terry v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F.
Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 4686 (U.S. May 25,
1976), noted in 23 U. KAN. L. RV. 289 (1975); cf. Note, Bar Restrictions on Dissemina-
tion of Information About Legal Services, 22 U.C.L.A.L. Ruv. 483, 503-15 (1974).
Third, the attorney may argue that disciplinary proceedings are not impartial, and
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Thus, plaintiffs attacking ethical restraints generally plead both antitrust
and constitutional violations,' 0 4 hoping that the restraints will be held
illegal as either private or state action.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has, of necessity, been speculative. Nevertheless, several
conclusions regarding the ethical restrictions on prepaid legal services
are permissible. First, the anticompetitive provisions of the 1969 Code
and Houston Amendments would probably violate the antitrust laws
unless exempt from liability-and no exemption is available to the ABA
or local bar associations. Second, state bar associations have some
protection under the Parker state action exemption, but preemption by
federal law makes that defense unreliable. By a strict antitrust analysis,
then, it would be advisable for the 1969 Code and Houston Amendment
restrictions on prepaid legal services to be abandoned. Moreover,
legitimate ethical concerns with solicitation, interposition of lay interme-
diaries, integrity, and competence may be enforced on a case-by-case
therefore violate due process because the hearing officials have a financial interest in the
outcome. Hearing officials will generally be attorneys engaged in traditional forms of
the practice of law; elimination of the competitive threat of prepaid legal services would
be in their financial interest. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). Due
process must be afforded in disciplinary proceedings. See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S.
544 (1968); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). The financial
interest theory, however, is limited by the necessity to have qualified individuals on the
disciplinary panel. See Berger v. Board of Psychologist Examiners, 521 F.2d 1056, 1064
n.12 (D.C .Cir. 1975).
Finally, discriminatory restrictions may be challenged as a denial of equal protection.
Cf. Silverman v. Browning, 359 F. Supp. 173, 177-80 (D. Conn. 1972), aff'd, 411 U.S.
941 (1973).
A consumer group is challenging the constitutionality of DR 2-101(A)(6), ABA
CODE, which prohibits lawyers from allowing their names to be published in law
lists not certified as "reputable." Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.
v. American Bar Ass'n, Civil No. 75-0105-R (E.D. Va., filed Feb. 27, 1975),
discussed in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 703, at A-9 (Mar. 4, 1975).
A similar action has been filed in the Northern District of California. See 2
ALTERNATIVES: LEGAL SERVICES & THE PUBLIC No. 6, at 2 (Dec. 1975). The law list
litigation may be mooted by 1976 amendments to the Code. See note 306 infra.
304. See Person v. Association of the Bar, Civil No. 75 C 1473 (E.D.N.Y., filed Sept.
18, 1975) (fee splitting), discussed in BNA ANwrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. No. 731, at
A-6 (Sept. 23, 1975); Person v. Association of the Bar, Civil No. 75 C 987 (E.D.N.Y.,
filed June 23, 1975) (advertising fees or specialties), discussed in BNA ANTrTRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. No. 720, at A-8 (July 1, 1975); Prelaw Society v. American Bar Ass'n,
Civil No. 75-009 (M.D. Tenn., filed Jan. 10, 1975) (Houston Amendments) (dismissed
pursuant to agreement of the parties Mar. 13, 1975). Cf. Sokol v. University Hosp.,
Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Mass. 1975) (restriction on practice of cardiac surgery).
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basis under the rules specifically governing those concerns. The stand-
ard suggested by Professor Sutton, Reporter of the ABA Committee
on Reevaluation of Legal Ethics, should avoid antitrust problems while
maintaining necessary regulation of the bar:
The rule[s] [governing prepaid legal services] are unduly restrictive if
they limit use of such plans more than is necessary in order to assure
that lawyers do not abuse clients or the public.30 5
The Chicago Amendments, unless restrictively interpreted, are close to
Professor Sutton's standard; they pose severe antitrust problems only
in the prohibition of closed panel plans sponsored by profitmaking or-
ganizations and in the regulation of advertising. Some advertising re-
strictions were relaxed in 1976 by further amendments to the Code,800
but the amendments will not greatly affect prepaid legal services.80 7
305. Hearings on the Organized Bar, supra note 6, at 36. Cf. American Medical
Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 533 (1943).
306. As amended, the Code now permits "a lawyer or law firm" to have:
A listing in a reputable law list, legal directory, a directory published by a
state, county or local bar association, or the classified section of telephone
company directories giving brief biographical and other informative data. A
law list or any directory is not reputable if its management or contents arelikely to be misleading or injurious to the public or to the profession. A lawlist or any directory is conclusively established to be reputable if it is certifiedby the American Bar Association as being in compliance with its rules and
standards. The published data may include only the following: name, includ-
ing name of law firm and names of professional associates; addresses and tele-
phone numbers; one or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm
concentrates, a statement that practice is limited to one or more fields of law,
or a statement that the lawyer or law firm specializes in a particular field of
law or law practice, to the extent permitted by the authority having jurisdiction
under state law over the subject and in accordance with rules prescribed by that
authority; date and place of birth; date and place of admission to the bar of
state and federal courts; schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees,
and other scholastic distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; military service;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships, of-fices, committee assignments, and section memberships in bar associations;
memberships and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies; technical andprofessional licenses; memberships in scientific, technical and professional as-
sociations and societies; foreign language ability; names and addresses of refer-
ences, and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; whether
credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted; office and other hours
of availability; a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the avail-
ability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to
be charged for the specific services; provided, all such published data shall bedisseminated only to the extent and in such format and language uniformly ap-
plicable to all lawyers, as prescribed by the authority having jurisdiction by
state law over the subject.
DR 2-102(A) (6), as approved by the House of Delegates, ADA, Feb. 17, 1976
[hereinafter cited as Philadelphia Amendments]. See BNA ANTrrusT & TRADE REn.
Rep. No. 752, at A-1 (Feb. 24, 1976).
307. The Philadelphia Amendments apply only to advertising by "a lawyer or a law
firm." See note 306 supra. Promotion of prepaid legal services is regulated by other
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Current litigation should define the permissible range of advertising
regulation by professional associations. 308 The need for litigation would
be eliminated, however, by adoption of a proposal of the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility that would permit
any advertising that did not amount to "a false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive or unfair statement or claim."30 9
There are antitrust problems in promoting prepaid legal serv-
ices as well as in restricting them. Bar-sponsored plans large enough to
stifle competition can be challenged under the Clayton Act and FTCA;
therefore it may be advisable, if such plans are desired, for the bar to
avoid control of them. Such plans, if sponsored by insurance compa-
nies, should be exempt from antitrust liability under the McCarran
Act."'0 Price-fixing mechanisms incorporated in plans can also violate
the antitrust laws. Thus, uniform benefit schedules should be avoided,
but relative value schedules ought to be permissible.811
The bar should easily be able to live within the boundaries of the
antitrust laws. If, however, the changes necessary to avoid liability are
rules which were not amended. See DR 2-101(B), Chicago Amendments, quoted in
note 38 supra; DR 2-103, Chicago Amendments, quoted in note 43 supra. The problems
with those rules therefore continue. See notes 129-41 supra and accompanying text.
Even as applied to lawyer's advertising, the Philadelphia Amendments are unlikely to
satisfy antitrust plaintiffs. Under the Amendments, the bar controls all methods of
advertising except classified ads in the yellow pages of telephone directories. Telephone
companies do not accept price advertising in their directories. Thus, despite authoriza-
tion of price advertising by the Amendments, it is as a practical matter unlikely to
occur. See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 18, 1976, at 6, col. 4; BNA ANTrrRusr & TADE
REG. REP. No. 752, at A-1, A-2 (Feb. 24, 1976).
308. In re American Medical Ass'n, No. 9064 (F.T.C., filed Dec. 22, 1975),
discussed in BNA ANTrraUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 744, at AA-1 (Dec. 23, 1975);
United States v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Civil No. G 75-558-CA5 (W.D. Mich.,
filed Nov. 24, 1975), discussed in BNA ANurrrUsT & TRADE REG. REP. No. 741, at A-1
(Dec. 2, 1975).
309. ABA Press Release No. 120575 (Dec. 6, 1975).
310. See note 213 supra. The Arizona State Bar plans to follow this route. See
PREPA J) LEGAL SERVICES 18 (statement of G. Randolf). But cf. Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (Supp. IV, 1974), which provides
that although insurance laws are not preempted by the Act, an ERISA plan or trust shall
not
be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company,
or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or bank-
ing for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance com-
panies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
311. But see United States v. American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, Civil No. 75-4640
(S.D.N.Y., filed Sept 22, 1975), discussed in BNA ANirusr & TRADE REG. REP. No.
732, at A-16 (Sept. 30, 1975).Washington University Open Scholarship
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found too arduous, the bar should at the minimum assure that all
anticompetitive restrictions are compelled by the state,"' 2 and preferably
seek a federal statutory exemption from application of the antitrust laws.
Continued pursuit of unprotected anticompetitive activity can only result
in litigation damaging to the image of the bar and a probable finding of
antitrust liability.
312. See Fisher & Galley, supra note 4, at 466-68.
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